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LIST AND DESIGNATION OF PARTIES
Pursuant to Rule 24(d), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Petitioners Lynn
Steadman, an individual and Steadman Land & Livestock, LLC, will be referred to herein
as "Steadman" or "Defendants"; and Respondent Sabrina Rahofy, an individual, will be
referred to herein as "Rahofy" or "Plaintiff.
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code
Ann. §78A-3-102(3)(a).
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Pursuant to Rule 51 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, this Court has granted
certiorari as to the following issues:
1. Whether the Court of Appeals misstated or misconstrued the factual background
in the course of its evaluation of the issues on appeal;

2. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the district court's order
compelling authorizations and in prescribing procedures for obtaining records from out-ofstate third parties.
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
On certiorari, the Utah Supreme Court reviews the decision of the Utah Court of
Appeals for correctness. Magana v. Dave Rock Construction, 2009, Utah 45, ^f 19, 215 P.
3d 143.
The standard of review of a trial court's order in matters of discovery is an abuse of
discretion. Gardner v. Board ofCnty Comm'srs, 2008 UT 6, 178 P. 3d 893 and State v.
Tanner, 2011 Ut.App. 39, 248 P. 3d 61.

vii

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This lawsuit arises from an automobile accident which occurred on August 7, 2005
in Cedar City, Utah. R. 4. At the time of the accident, Plaintiff was a resident of the State
of Illinois and was traveling through Utah. R. 4.
Plaintiff filed suit in the Fifth Judicial District Court, State of Utah, alleging that, as
a result of the accident and as a proximate result of Defendants' negligence, Plaintiff
sustained significant personal injury, R. 6, disability, R. 7, and damages (including general
damages, medical expenses, future medical expenses, future lost income, loss of future
earning capacity, lost wages, interest and other damages). R. 7.
Defendant answered Plaintiffs Complaint. R. 16.
Plaintiff filed Initial Disclosures identifying, among other things, the identity of health
care providers who rendered treatment to Plaintiff following the accident. R. 26 - 27.
Defendants served Interrogatories, pursuant to Rule 33, Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure1, R. 34, asking Plaintiff to fully disclose all special damages she sustained, all
medical expenses and future medical expenses she sustained, all lost wages she claimed, all
future losses of earning capacity, and describe all documentation which support her claims.
Interrogatory No. 10. She was also asked to described in detail all injuries and symptoms
she sustained and to identify whether any such injuries or damages pre-dated (or post-dated)
the accident. See Interrogatories No. 11 and 13. She was asked to identify the physicians

X

A copy of Defendant's First Set of Interrogatories to Plaintiff is attached as

Addendum 10.
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who had treated her prior to the accident. See, Interrogatory No. 12. She was asked to
identify each medical care provider who had examined or treated her within the prior 20
years and to provide the dates of treatment, the conditions or complaints that led to the
treatment, and the results of such treatment. See, Interrogatory No. 14. She was also asked
to identify all employment she had had within the past 20 years. See, Interrogatory No. 15.
Defendant served Requests for Production of Documents, pursuant to Rule 34, Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure2, asking Plaintiff to produce, among other things, each medical
report, record, diagnostic study or test, or other document which related to the injuries or
symptoms claimed to be caused, aggravated or related to the accident and the cost of each
billing. See Request for Production, Nos. 8, 9 and 10. She was asked to produce each
medical report, record or document pertaining to any pre-existing condition. See, Request
for Production No. 11. She was asked to produce the documents which support her claim
for lost wages, impairment to earning capacity, and her state and federal income tax returns.
See Request for Production No. 12 -14. She was asked to produce copies of all documents
identified in the Answers to Interrogatories. See Request for Production No. 20.
In response to Defendants' interrogatories, Plaintiff identified employers and
healthcare providers who had rendered treatment to her before the accident. She indicated
that she was in the process of gathering documents in connection with the Request for
Production of Documents. She indicated that "She should have the documents within two
weeks." R. 70. When documents were not produced by Plaintiff, Defendants forwarded
2

A copy of Defendants' First Request for Production of Documents is attached
as Addendum 11.
ix

authorizations to Plaintiff which would allow Defendant to obtain the out-of-state
employment and medical records. R. 71. Counsel for Plaintiff refused to sign the
Authorizations for the release of medical and employment records. R. 72.
When attempts to informally resolve the issue of whether Plaintiff was required to
sign the requested authorizations failed, Defendants filed a Motion to Compel asking the trial
court to order Plaintiff to sign the authorizations, allowing Defendant to obtain the records
directly from the health care providers and employers. R. 66-68. Defendants argued that
Rule 26(b)(1), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, allows a defendant to obtain discovery
regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the
pending action. R. 72. Defendants argued that Plaintiff had placed her medical condition in
issue and had waived the privilege against production of the documents. R. 76. Defendants
argued that, since many of the health care providers and employers were not within the state
of Utah, Defendants could not obtain the required information by subpoena issued by a Utah
court. R. 73. Defendants cited the trial court to Hales v. Oldrovd, 999 P.2d 588 (Utah App.
2000) (and other cases) wherein the Utah Court of Appeals held that courts are empowered
to compel a Plaintiff to execute authorizations to allow defendants to obtain medical records
from out-of-state providers. R. 74.
Plaintiff opposed the Motion to Compel, arguing that Plaintiff had already provided
"meaningful discovery responses" (by simply identifying the names and addresses of
employers and health care providers), R. 87 - 88, that Defendants are not entitled to the
requested authorizations to allow them to obtain records from prior health care providers or

x

employers, R. 88 - 89, that the records sought are privileged , R. 91, and that Plaintiff was
not required to sign the requested authorizations for the release of employment records, R.
92-93. Plaintiff claimed the records are "irrelevant." R. 93. Plaintiff further argued that
she did not possess a copy of her employment records, and stated that it is "unknown whether
an employer would release the entire personnel file even if the employee requested it.
Defendants have been provided the contact information for the employers. Defendants may
contact the employers themselves." R. 94.
Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the Lower Courts
A hearing on Defendant's Motion to Compel was held by the trial court on May 22,
2009. R. 171. After reviewing the memoranda on the Motion to Compel and hearing oral
argument from counsel for both parties, the Honorable G. Michael Westfall issued the trial
court's Order requiring Plaintiff to execute authorizations for all out-of-state employment
records and to provide those authorizations to Defendants. R. 174. The trial Court also
ordered Plaintiff to execute authorizations to allow Defendants to obtain the out-of-state
medical records identified by Plaintiff. R. 175.
Because of Plaintiff s claim of the sensitive nature of some of the records which might
be produced, the trial court outlined a procedure where, if Plaintiff claimed a specific
privilege of privacy to specific medical records, the records could be obtained by Plaintiff
(not Defendants) and submitted to the trial court for an in camera review and determination
as to whether Defendants would be entitled to review the records3.
3

A complete copy of the transcript of the parties' oral argument on Defendants'
Motion to Compel before the trial court is included as Addendum 8.
xi

On June 19, 2009, Plaintiff filed an ExParte Motion to Stay Order. R. 178. Plaintiff
filed an Interlocutory Appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals. The Utah Court of Appeals
reversed the trial court's order granting Defendants' Motion to Compel.
On or about January 6, 2011, Defendants filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari. On
March 29, 2011, the Writ of Certiorari was granted by the Utah Supreme Court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

On August 7,2006, Plaintiff and Defendant Lynn Steadman were involved in

an automobile accident (hereinafter the "Accident") in Cedar City, Utah. Opinion at % 2, R.
3-8.
2.

At the time of the accident Plaintiff was a resident of Illinois and not a resident

of the State of Utah. R. 4.
3.

At the time the accident occurred, Plaintiff was on her way to California to

start a new job. R. 115.
4.

Plaintiff filed suit against Defendants on October 4, 2007, claiming personal

injuries as a result of the accident. R. 3-8.
5.

Plaintiff alleges she suffered injuries, "including, but not limited to, injury

to her right shoulder, left knee, left ankle, right ankle, right leg, right foot, and injury to her
upper and lower back. R. 6.
6.

Plaintiff alleges that she has "suffered great pain, emotional stress, loss of

enjoyment of life," and claims she has suffered "permanent physical injury and disability
with a whole body disability rating of 20%." R. 6-7.
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7.

Plaintiff claims she suffers chronic neck pain since the accident, and is unable

to work at the computer for extended periods of time without pain flaring up. She claims that
her neck pain interferes with her Yoga practice and flares up when she is sitting for extended
periods of time. She claims she is unable to run for long distances and unable to pick up
heavy objects. She claims she has pain and pinched nerves between her shoulder blades,
which pain interferes with her Yoga. She claims she is unable to do push-ups. She alleges
severe panic attacks and alleged mood swings due to inability to teach Yoga at the level she
was accustomed to prior to the accident. R. 102.
8.

Plaintiff seeks damages for medical expenses, future medical expenses, lost

wages, future lost income, and loss of future earning capacity. R. 7.
9.

On or about January 14, 2008, Plaintiff filed Initial Disclosures, wherein

Plaintiff disclosed a number of health care providers who treated Plaintiff following the
accident of August 7,2006 and referred to an "Independent Medical Evaluation" dated April
4, 2007 by Stuart W. King, M.D., in which Dr. King:
•

referred to her past medical history, including "several sports related injuries;"

•

referred to her complaints of "occasional back pain and some chiropractic
treatment in the past, before the accident;"
reviewed her work in the past as a "professional dog walker;"
opines that she will "require chronic pain management for the rest of her life;"
and
assigned a whole person "impairment rating" to Plaintiff of 20%. R. 25-28.
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10.

In the Initial Disclosures, Plaintiff also referred to an Evaluation of Economic

Losses submitted from Dr. Paul H. Randle, wherein Dr. Randle:
•

estimated the "present value of the economic losses created as a result of
Sabrina's injuries, not including statutory pre-judgment interest, is $724,016.

•

Refers to her "normal capacity to earn" as being equal to $ 17,060 per year; and

•

makes other assumptions regarding her claimed lost wages and lost earning
capacity. R. 25-28.

11.

On January 26, 2008, Defendants served Interrogatories and Requests for

Production of Documents on Plaintiff, seeking (among other information) the identity of all
health care providers who had rendered medical treatment to Plaintiff within 20 years of the
accident. R. 34 - 37.
12. Defendants served Interrogatories, pursuant to Rule 33, Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. R. 34. In the Interrogatories, Plaintiff was asked to:
10.
State and fully describe all special damages that you are claiming in this
lawsuit including but not limited to medical expenses, future medical
expenses, lost wages, future losses of earning capacity, etc., and indicate the
amounts you are claiming, your method for arriving at each such amount, and
describe all documentation in your possession which supports or may refute
such claims.
11.
Describe in detail all injuries and symptoms, whether physical, mental
or emotional, experienced since the occurrence and claimed to have been
caused, aggravated, or otherwise contributed to by the occurrence.
12. If any of the injuries or conditions for which you claim damages for
personal injuries caused by the accident are an aggravation of a preexisting
condition, please identify which conditions are an aggravation of a preexisting
condition, describe in detail the preexisting conditions, and state the name and
address of each medical practitioner who treated you for the preexisting
condition, the date of treatment and the nature of such treatment.
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13. If you have suffered any aggravation of the symptoms or injuries which
you claim from this accident since the time of the accident, please state the
date of each such aggravation, the cause of each such aggravation, a detailed
description of each aggravation, the names and addresses of all persons who
may have witnessed the aggravation, and the names and addresses of all
medical practitioners rendering treatment for such aggravations.
14.
State the name and address of each medical care provider, including but
not limited to, each hospital, psychiatrist, psychologist, mental health agency,
mental health therapist, chiropractor, nurse practitioner, physician's assistant,
acupuncturist, neuropathologist, massage therapist, or other health care
provider who has examined you or treated you during the past 20 years and
state the dates of treatment, the conditions or complaints that led to treatment,
and the results of such treatment or examinations.
15.
With regard to all employment or businesses that you have worked for
in the past 20 years, please state the name and address of each employer, the
date of commencement and termination, the place of employment, the nature
of the duties performed, the name and address of each supervisor, the rate of
pay received and the reasons for termination. See Interrogatories, 10-15.
13. Defendants also served Requests for Production of Documents, pursuant to Rule
34, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. R. 36. Plaintiff was asked to produce, among other
things:
8. Each and every medical report, medical record, hospital report, or other
document which relates to the injuries and symptoms, whether physical, mental
or emotional, experienced since the occurrence and claimed to have been
caused, aggravated, or otherwise contributed to by it.
9. Each and every report of any diagnostic study, test or procedure performed
since the accident.
10. Each and every receipt, bill, check, invoice or other document which
supports your claim for medical expenses allegedly incurred as a result of this
accident.
11. Each and every medical report, medical record, hospital record, hospital
report, or other document which relates to any pre-existing condition which
you allege was aggravated by the accident.
-4-

12. Each and every report or other document which you contend supports your
claim for lost time from gainful employment.
13. Each and every document which you contend supports your claim for
impairment to earning capacity.
14. Each and every record, written memoranda, copies of Federal or State
Income Tax Returns, or other document which purports to show all or any
portion of the income received by you for the five years immediately preceding
the accident to the present time.

20.
Please produce each and every document identified in your answers to
interrogatories served simultaneously with these requests.
See Interrogatories, No. 8-14, 20.
14.

In response to Defendants' Interrogatory number 14 (requesting "the name

and address of each medical provider... who has examined or treated [Plaintiff] during the
past 20 years [and] . . . the dates of treatment, the conditions or complaints that led to
treatment, and the results of such treatment or examinations"), Plaintiff identified:
Dr. D. Dettore, 6827 Stanley Ave., Berwyn, IL 60402. Primary physician for
the past 25 years. Plaintiff generally experienced the cold and chronic ear
aches;
•

Dr. Cecil Brown in Brookfield, IL, Chiropractic care in 1994 for sports related
injury to Plaintiffs back;
Planned Parenthood, 1000 E Washington, Springfield,
Gynecological care from 1999 to 2001;

IL 62703.

Women's Health Care Center, 3435 N. Sheffield, Chicago, IL 60657.
Gynecological care from 2002 to 2007;
Woodbridge Health Center, 8580 Cinder Bed Road, Woodbridge, VA22191.
Obstetric care during current pregnancy. R.104.
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15.

In response to Defendants' Interrogatory number 15 (requesting the name and

address of each of Plaintiff s employers for the past 20 years, the hire and termination date
for each employer, the nature of her duties performed, the name and address of each
supervisor, her pay rate and the reasons for termination), Plaintiff identified 25 employers;
17 of which had employed Plaintiff since 2001. R. 104-105.
16.

On May 8, 2008, Defendants sent a letter to Plaintiffs counsel containing

authorizations for Plaintiff to execute to allow Defendants to obtain Plaintiffs medical and
employment records, since the healthcare providers and employers are not within the State
of Utah and not subject to a Utah-issued subpoena. R. 110-111.
17.

Plaintiff did not provide any signed Releases for her medical or employment

records as requested by Defendants. R. 113.
18.

On May 14,2008, Plaintiff specifically declined to sign authorizations for the

release of employment and medical records. R. 72.
19.

In a May 21st, 2008 letter, defense counsel again attempted to obtain signed

authorizations for release of the records of the entities identified. R. 80-82.
20.

On August 15,2008, due to Plaintiffs refusal to sign any of the authorizations,

Defendants filed a Motion to Compel, requesting the trial court to order Plaintiff to sign the
authorizations. R. 66-68.
21.

On December 8, 2008, oral argument on Defendants' Motion to Compel was

scheduled by the trial court. R. 152. Immediately prior to the time of the hearing, counsel
for both parties met to discuss the pending motion. During the meeting, counsel believed

-6-

they had reached an agreement regarding the production of the documents Defendants
sought. Counsel indicated to the trial court that they had reached an agreement on the issue
of the production of the records, whereby the medical records of the health care providers
and the employment records would be obtained and submitted either to the trial court or a
third party (to be agreed upon by counsel). The trial court (or agreed-upon third party)
would review disputed medical/employment records to determine which records are
reasonably relevant to the case and subject to discovery. The parameters to determine
relevance would be stipulated to by counsel. The parties also indicated that, if an agreement
could not be reached on particular issues, counsel would re-submit the Motion to Compel for
decision by the trial court or request a hearing. R. 158.
22. After the December 8th hearing, despite the preliminary agreement, the parties
were unable to reach a formal agreement regarding execution of the authorizations and
production of the identified employment/medical records. When informal discussion broke
down concerning the accumulation and review of the records, upon notice from counsel, the
matter was again presented to the trial court for resolution. The trial court scheduled oral
argument on Defendants' Motion to Compel for May 22, 2009. R. 169-170.
23.

After considering the Memoranda from the parties on Defendants' Motion to

Compel, and after oral argument, the trial court, Honorable G. Michael Westfall ordered:
•

Plaintiff shall execute authorizations for all employment records and return the
signed authorizations to the defendants . . . on or before June 22, 2009.
Defendants were authorized to access any employment records with regard to
Plaintiff. R. 174.
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Plaintiff shall provide the Court and Defendants a complete list of every
medical service Plaintiff had received - including the date, medical provider,
medical problem presented and medical service provided. Plaintiff shall also
designate which medical records Plaintiff believes are not relevant to the case
and, therefore, subject to privacy. R. 175.
•

Defendants were authorized to receive the medical records for those records
for which Plaintiff did not claim a continuing privacy privilege. Plaintiff was
ordered to either disclose those specific records directly to Defendants or
provide a signed authorization for the release of the records to Defendants. R.
175.

•

If Plaintiff claimed a continuing privacy privilege or claimed the requested
medical records were irrelevant to the issues raised in the litigation,
Defendants would have 30 days after receipt of the list of the healthcare
providers to object to Plaintiffs claimed continuing privacy privilege, by filing
an appropriate motion with the trial court. R. 175.
In the event Defendants filed the motion with the Court seeking the records,
Plaintiff would have 30 days to obtain the records to which continuing privacy
privilege was claimed and to submit those records to the trial court for in
camera review. The trial court would then make a determination as to whether
or not the records would be disclosed to defendants. R. 174-175.

23.

Plaintiff filed a Petition for Permission to Appeal Interlocutory Order. R. 185.

24.

The Utah Court of Appeals issued an Opinion on December 9, 2010, and

concluded "Because Defendants could have accessed the requested records without
circumventing the discovery rules, the district court abused its discretion in entertaining and
granting the Motion to Compel. Rahofy v. Steadman, 2010, Utah App. 350, ^ 12.
25.The Utah Court of Appeals reversed the district court's Order compelling
discovery and remanded the case to the district court, claiming the district court "abused its
discretion in granting Defendants' Motion to Compel when defendants failed to request
documents pursuant to the discovery rules." Rahofy, % 14.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Utah Court of Appeals misconstrued the factual background in the course of its
evaluation of the issues on appeal in this case. First, Plaintiff claimed, for the first time on
appeal, that Defendants did not make a formal discovery request for Plaintiffs medical and
employment records. Plaintiff previously acknowledged in her brief to the Utah Court of
Appeals that this issue was not raised before the trial court. Defendants did formally request
Plaintiffs medical and employment records in Defendants' Interrogatories and Request for
Production of Documents to Plaintiff.
Second, the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court's order compelling
Plaintiff to execute authorizations enabling Defendants to obtain Plaintiffs out-of-state
medical and employment records. The trial court, prior to granting Defendants' Motion to
Compel, heard all of the relevant background facts, reviewed the procedural history of the
case, and correctly determined that Plaintiff should be ordered to execute the authorizations
prepared by Defendants. The trial court is in the best position to handle discovery disputes
because it is familiar with the issues in the cases before it.
Third, the Court of Appeals, unnecessarily imposed a procedure to obtain out-of-state
medical records which is unjust, expensive, burdensome, and overly complicated. Further,
even if the procedure outlined by the Court of Appeals were to be followed, many health care
providers who will not produce records (even in response to a records subpoena) without a
signed authorization from the patient.
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Finally, the procedure set forth by the Court of Appeals is not in harmony with prior
decisions of Utah courts (as well as courts from other jurisdictions) which have considered
the issue of whether a trial court has discretion to order a Plaintiff to execute authorizations.

ARGUMENT
I.

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN EXPRESSING THE
FACTUAL BACKGROUND OF THIS MATTER
Utah Appellate Courts have a long-standing policy of refusing to hear issues raised

for the first time on appeal. This case is a classic example of why this policy is so essential
See. Moa v. Edwards. 2011 UT App 140, 681 Ut. Adv. Rep. 26, Cannon v. Salt Lake
Regional Medical Center, Inc.. 2005 UT App 3525121 P.3d 74 andlnreE.R.. 2001 UT App
66,21P.3d680.
On appeal, for the first time, Plaintiff argued that Defendants "never made a formal
discovery request. . . for the medical or employment records which they seek to obtain
through the releases. Furthermore, the Defendants have never made a formal discovery
request... for the signed releases." Appellant's (Rahofy's ) Brief, to the Court of Appeals,
p. 28. Plaintiff expressly acknowledged in her brief that these arguments were never raised
nor discussed in the trial Court:
Plaintiff concedes that Rule 37 and its requirements were never discussed in
memorandum or argument related to Defendants' Motion to Compel."
Appellant's (Rahofy's) Brief, p. 28.
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Nevertheless, Plaintiff claimed that Defendants' alleged failure to formally request
pursuant to Rule 34 was "plain error," that the "error is harmful," and that there was a
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the appellant.. [or the] "confidence
in the verdict is undermined." Appellant's (Rahofy's) Brief, p. 29.
The Utah Court of Appeals held that the trial court abused its discretion in granting
Defendants' motion to compel when Defendants failed to request documents pursuant to the
discovery rules of Rule 34, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Rahofv. ^J14.
In actuality, Defendants had formally requested the disputed records.
Interrogatories served on Plaintiff, she was asked to identify:
10.
State and fully describe all special damages that you are claiming in this
lawsuit including but not limited to medical expenses, future medical
expenses, lost wages, future losses of earning capacity, etc., and indicate the
amounts you are claiming, your method for arriving at each such amount, and
describe all documentation in your possession which supports or may refute
such claims.
11.
Describe in detail all injuries and symptoms, whether physical, mental
or emotional, experienced since the occurrence and claimed to have been
caused, aggravated, or otherwise contributed to by the occurrence.
12. If any of the injuries or conditions for which you claim damages for
personal injuries caused by the accident are an aggravation of a preexisting
condition, please identify which conditions are an aggravation of a preexisting
condition, describe in detail the preexisting conditions, and state the name and
address of each medical practitioner who treated you for the preexisting
condition, the date of treatment and the nature of such treatment.
13.
If you have suffered any aggravation of the symptoms or injuries which
you claim from this accident since the time of the accident, please state the
date of each such aggravation, the cause of each such aggravation, a detailed
description of each aggravation, the names and addresses of all persons who
may have witnessed the aggravation, and the names and addresses of all
medical practitioners rendering treatment for such aggravations.
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In the

14.
State the name and address of each medical care provider, including but
not limited to, each hospital, psychiatrist, psychologist, mental health agency,
mental health therapist, chiropractor, nurse practitioner, physician's assistant,
acupuncturist, neuropathologist, massage therapist, or other health care
provider who has examined you or treated you during the past 20 years and
state the dates of treatment, the conditions or complaints that led to treatment,
and the results of such treatment or examinations.
15.
With regard to all employment or businesses that you have worked for
in the past 20 years, please state the name and address of each employer, the
date of commencement and termination, the place of employment, the nature
of the duties performed, the name and address of each supervisor, the rate of
pay received and the reasons for termination.
16. If you have ever applied for or received disability payments, workers
compensation payments, Medicaid benefits, UMAP benefits, or health
insurance benefits, please state the name, address and telephone number of
each provider that you applied to, the insurance plan or group number used to
identify yourself, the dates of the coverage, and sought, whether your claim
was granted or denied, and if granted, the nature of benefits received.
17. If you have ever applied for unemployment insurance benefits, please
identify the claim number, assigned to each claim you have made, indicate
whether you were granted or denied benefits for each claim made, the date of
each decision, and the name of the government agency that issued the decision.
18. If you have ever applied for services or benefits from any state or
federal agency including but not limited to the Utah State Office of
Rehabilitation, Utah State Office of Workforce Services, and the Utah
Department of Human Services, please indicate the date and governmental
agency you applied for said services or benefits, identify the claim number
assigned to each application you made if a claim number was assigned,
indicate whether your application for services or benefits was granted or
denied, and if granted, describe in detail the kind of services or benefits you
have received.
See, Addendum 10, Interrogatories, No. 10-18.
In the Requests for Production of Documents, Plaintiff was asked to produce, among
other documents:
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8. Each and every medical report, medical record, hospital report, or other
document which relates to the injuries and symptoms, whether physical, mental
or emotional, experienced since the occurrence and claimed to have been
caused, aggravated, or otherwise contributed to by it.
9. Each and every report of any diagnostic study, test or procedure performed
since the accident.
10. Each and every receipt, bill, check, invoice or other document which
supports your claim for medical expenses allegedly incurred as a result of this
accident.
11. Each and every medical report, medical record, hospital record, hospital
report, or other document which relates to any pre-existing condition which
you allege was aggravated by the accident.
12. Each and every report or other document which you contend supports your
claim for lost time from gainful employment.
13. Each and every document which you contend supports your claim for
impairment to earning capacity.
14. Each and every record, written memoranda, copies of Federal or State
Income Tax Returns, or other document which purports to show all or any
portion of the income received by you for thefiveyears immediately preceding
the accident to the present time.
15. Each and every application, record, written memoranda, report or other
document submitted to the governmental agency and/or private provider to
support your claim for disability benefits and/or worker's compensation
benefits, the decision granting or denying benefits, and if granted, each and
every record, written memoranda, report or other document which shows all
or any portion of payments received from disability or workmen's
compensation.
16. Please provide copies of all health insurance records, claim forms,
eligibility cards, or other documents you may have in your possession with
respect to all health insurance policies, plans of health insurance, or health
insurers in your possession.
17. Please provide copies of all of your unemployment insurance benefit
applications, state agency records granting or denying unemployment
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insurance benefits, or other documents you may have in your possession with
respect to each and every claim you have made for unemployment insurance
benefits with any state agency.

20.
Please produce each and every document identified in your answers to
interrogatories served simultaneously with these requests.
See, Addendum 11, Request for Production, No. 8-17, 20.
Contrary to the Court of Appeals' decision, Defendants did request documents
pursuant to discovery rules. Defendants had served Interrogatories, pursuant to Rule 33 Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure and Requests for Production of Documents, pursuant to Rule 34
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure - seeking, among other things, the identity of, and the
production of, documents related to her prior health care and employment. R. 34 & 36.
Plaintiff submitted some, but incomplete, responsive information and documents. R. 98-107.
Defendants then sought by letter4 and phone calls to have Plaintiff provide more complete
responses to the discovery requests (including addresses of disclosed health care providers
and former employers) and to provide authorizations to allow Defendants to gather the
records from out-of-state former health care providers and former employers directly. R.
110.
Plaintiff objected and refused to provide the authorizations requested - claiming that
Plaintiff had already provided all "relevant" documents5 (medical records generated

4

Rule 37(a)(2)(A) requires the parties to confer and attempt to resolve
discovery issues without trial court involvement.
5

Plaintiff contends that she, alone, determines what records are "relevant" and
which records are not. R. 89.
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subsequent to the accident) R. 85, but objected to the requests to sign authorizations because
the authorizations requested records of "five medical providers who had no involvement or
relation to the collision." R. 86. Plaintiff also claimed that such a request was improper
because the authorizations, in effect, would give Defendants "unfettered access to Plaintiffs
entire medical history." R. 89.
Plaintiff never based her objection to the authorizations on the claim the
authorizations were not formally served or that she didn't understand what was requested.
Rather, the objections were objections of "relevancy, " claims of "unfettered access" to
Plaintiffs medical records and to the "scope of records" requested.
Had Plaintiff properly notified counsel or the trial court that she objected to producing
the authorizations because they were not formally served (which Defendants claim they
were), the trial court could have considered that argument. Defendants could have responded
to such claim. If the trial court found that the authorizations were not formally served, and
believed there was a requirement to do so, the "defect," (if one existed) could have easily
"cured" by simply requiring Defendants to formally serve the authorizations with a Request
for Production of the signed authorizations.
Instead, Plaintiff waited until the issue was "on appeal" and the documents designated
for appeal had already been identified before raising the issue of an alleged failure to comply
with Rules 34 and 37.
Defendants had, in fact, requested the records pursuant to Rule 33 and Rule 34, Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, prior to filing the Motion to Compel with the trial Court. Plaintiff
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(and the trial court) clearly understood what records were being requested. The dispute in
the trial court was to the scope of the requests; not to the procedure used for the request.
II.

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REVERSING THE DISTRICT
COURT'S ORDER COMPELLING AUTHORIZATIONS AND IN
PRESCRIBING COMPLICATED, TIME-CONSUMING, AND EXPENSIVE
PROCEDURES FOR OBTAINING RECORDS FROM OUT-OF-STATE
THIRD-PARTIES.
The issue of whether a trial court has authority to require a Plaintiff to execute medical

and employment authorizations to allow a defendant to obtain out-of-state records is not a
new issue to appellate courts.
The trial court, in exercising its discretion, correctly ruled that it had inherent authority
to require Plaintiff to execute authorizations to allow Defendant to obtain out-of-state
records. One of the issues before this Court is whether the trial court abused its discretion
in ordering the execution of such authorizations.
Utah Appellate courts have long held a trial court has broad discretion to handle
discovery matters affecting cases before the trial court. "Because the trial judge deals
directly with the parties and the discovery process, he or she has great latitude in determining
the most efficient and fair manner to conduct the court's business..." A.K. & R. Whipple
Plumbing and Heating v. Aspen Const., 1999 UT App 87, f 36, 977 P.2d 518, rehearing
denied, certiorari denied, 994 P.2d 1271. A trial court has inherent power "to make, modify,
and enforce rules for the regulation of the business before [it], to recall and control its
process, [and] to direct and control its officers..." Edwards v. Powder Mountain Water and
Sewer, 2009 UT App 185, \ 21, 214 P.3d 120 (quoting In Re Evans, 42 Utah 282, 130 P.
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217,224 (1913)). The Utah Supreme Court, in Featherstone v. Schaerrer. 2001 UT 86, ^ 16,
34 P.3d 194 (rehearing denied), stated "It is undoubtedly true that courts of general and
superior jurisdiction possess certain inherent powers not derived from any statute. Among
these are the power to punish for contempt, to make, modify, and enforce rules for the
regulation of the business before the court..." Additionally, Appellate courts grant a trial
judge broad discretion in determining how a case should proceed. A trial court's mling will
be overturned only if there is no reasonable basis for the decision. Tschaggenv v. Millbank
Ins. Co.. 2007 UT 37, % 16, 16 P.3d 615, 619..
In her Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Compel, Plaintiff did not claim that
Defendants had failed to seek the records pursuant to Rules 33, 34 and 37 of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure. Rather, Plaintiff claimed that she did not have the records6 which had
been requested in her possession, R. 94, and thus did not have to produce such records. She
claimed that the records requested were irrelevant and "not necessary for the proof of the
case." R. 94.
Plaintiffs position regarding discovery in this case is that the only medical records
in this case which are relevant are those records which Plaintiff determines are relevant and
which reflect treatment Plaintiff received after the subject automobile accident. R. 88-89.

6

Plaintiff advised the trial court that she was not in possession of Ihe records
and "it is unknown whether an employer would release the entire personnel file even if the
employee requested it. Defendants have been provided the contact information for the
employers, Defendants may contact the employers themselves." R. 94. Emphasis added.
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Plaintiff has also claimed Defendants are not entitled to her employment records because she
feels they are "irrelevant".7
The trial court recognized that in order to properly defend against Plaintiffs claims,
Defendants are entitled to obtain Plaintiff s prior medical and employment records. The trial
court further understood that Plaintiffs past medical and employment records are clearly
relevant in determining Plaintiffs prior physical condition and employment history, to
establish a "base-line" for her health and employment status so as to determine whether there
has, in fact, been injury or damage caused. It is also essential to gather such records to
determine whether pre-existing conditions are present.
The trial court considered the arguments propounded by Plaintiff regarding relevancy,
privilege, and the argument that "Defendants may contact the employers themselves" without
authorization, and rejected them. R. 174. The trial court correctly ruled that Defendants are
entitled to obtain the medical and employment records of Plaintiff and, insofar as those
records are located out-of-state, Plaintiff is required to execute authorizations allowing
Defendant to obtain those records.
The Court of Appeals decision mistakenly indicates that "Defendants attempted to
avoid the requirements of Rules 34 and 37 by arguing that the authorizations were the only
way to access certain records because those records are located outside of Utah." Rahofy,
U 11. In point of fact, Defendants did not attempt to avoid Rules 34 and 37 - but sought

7

Plaintiff claims her employment records are irrelevant, even though she held
seventeen different jobs in a five year period of time and now is seeking $724,000 in
economic damages. Appellee's (Steadman's) Brief, p. 20.
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discovery pursuant to such rules, including asking the trial court to compel execution of
authorizations to allow Defendants to obtain the requested out-of-state records (which
Plaintiff claimed she did not have in her possession).
Further, Defendants did not claim the authorizations "were the only way to access
certain records because those records are located outside of Utah." Rather, at oral argument
before the Court of Appeals, when this issue was first raised, Defendants acknowledged that
there were other ways to seek the requested records - including the process outlined by the
Court of Appeals in its decision - but indicated that the procedure outlined by the Court of
Appeals was cumbersome, expensive, unnecessary and may, in fact, eventually require the
execution of a release even after a subpoena was obtained in the foreign jurisdiction.
Counsel indicated that the process suggested by the Utah Court of Appeals would, generally,
require retention of additional counsel (counsel licensed to practice in the jurisdiction where
the records are located), require the court to obtain jurisdiction over the parties in the foreign
jurisdiction, involve the additional costs of filing (and service) of the record-seeking lawsuit
in the foreign jurisdiction, and other additional costs. Even after the expenditure of these
significant (and unnecessary) expenses and time, oftentimes health care providers
nevertheless require a signed authorization from the patient, rather than a subpoena from a
court. See, Addendum 12, letter from Social Security Administration (in an unrelatedcase)affirming federal laws which prohibit the release of records, even when served with a
subpoena, in the absence of written consent from the individual whose records are being
requested.
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Clearly, the trial court was able to exercise its discretion in considering the arguments
of counsel, considering the costs of compelling execution of authorizations as compared to
incurring the costs of retaining counsel in a foreign jurisdiction, filing another suit (in the
foreign jurisdiction), obtaining jurisdiction in the foreign jurisdiction, having the subpoena
issued in the foreign jurisdiction, and then actually seeking (via the foreign-issued subpoena)
the records and make its decision.
The trial court was well-informed of the issues of obtaining Plaintiffs out-of-state
records. Having considered the memoranda by the parties, having heard oral argument by
counsel, and having been involved in overseeing this case from its inception, the trial court
properly exercised its discretion in ordering Plaintiff to execute the medical and employment
records authorizations.
III.

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN IMPOSING A PROCEDURE
TO OBTAIN "OUT-OF-STATE" MEDICAL AND EMPLOYMENT
RECORDS WHICH IS UNJUST, UNNECESSARILY COMPLICATED, AND
UNNECESSARILY EXPENSIVE.
Rule 1(a) refers to the intent of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and states that

"They shall be liberally construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination
of every action." See also, W.W. & W.B. Gardner, Inc. v. Park West Village, Inc., 568 P.2d
734, 738 (Utah 1977).
Applying these principles, the trial court considered the position of the parties,
considered the discovery which had been propounded, the responses to discovery which had
been provided by Plaintiff, and the requests for the execution of authorizations to obtain outof-state records.

The trial court, who is charged with overseeing discovery disputes,
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provided a "just, speedy and inexpensive" way to obtain the records sought - while still
allowing a procedure (in camera review, if necessary) whereby certain records could be
additionally reviewed by the trial court to determine if production is appropriate.
Modern rules of civil procedure are designed to facilitate fair trials with full disclosure
of all relevant testimony and evidence. Roundv v. Stalev, 1999 UT App 229, ^ 8, 984 P.2d
404, certiorari denied, 994 P.2d 1271. Additionally, rules with respect to discovery must be
applied with common sense and within reasonable bounds, consistent with its objective.
State ex. rel. Road Comm'n v. Petty. 412 P.2d 914,917 (Utah 1966). The trial court's Order
accomplishes these objectives.
IV.

THE PROCEDURE OUTLINED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS IS NOT IN
HARMONY WITH OTHER CASES WHICH HAVE CONSIDERED THE
ISSUE OF REQUIRING A PLAINTIFF TO SIGN AUTHORIZATIONS.
Utah courts have touched lightly on Motions to Compel plaintiffs to sign

authorizations. In Hales v. Oldroyd, 2000 UT App 75, the plaintiffs refusal to sign
authorizations for release of medical information resulted in several motions to compel which
were granted by the trial court, ^flj 4-7. The out-of-state medical providers were beyond the
reach of defendant's subpoenas (as in the present case), and the trial court in Hales ordered
the plaintiff to sign the authorizations for release of medical information. Id. at ^ 6.
Courts in other jurisdictions have specifically addressed the practice of requiring a
party to sign authorizations allowing a defendant to obtain medical records. In Ayuluk v.
Red Oaks Assisted Living.Inc., 201 P.3d 1183 (Alaska 2009); rehearing denied, March 16,
2009, the Supreme Court of Alaska stated:
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[Wjhen a plaintiffs medical privilege has been waived by the filing of suit,
"discovery should normally proceed without judicial participation../in a
manner demonstrating candor and common sense.' Requiring a plaintiff to
furnish medical releases to her adversaries is one way to accomplish that
objective. Further, so doing as an alternative to requiring plaintiffs counsel
to produce medical records can result in the discovery of medical records of
which plaintiffs counsel is aware. It also eliminates requiring defendants to
rely on plaintiffs counsel... "as the gatekeeper for the production of medical
records that he considered relevant."
Ayulek, at 1204.
Likewise, the Supreme Court of Florida, in Rojas v. Ryder Truck Rental Inc., 641
So.2d 855, 857 (Florida 1994), held that a trial court had authority to order a personal injury
plaintiff to sign written authorizations for the release of plaintiffs out-of-state medical
records and further determined the defendant did not need to file a formal request for
production of documents through the party. The Rojas court stated:
The order [from the trial court] here was well within the power and discretion
of the trial court. A trial court possesses broad discretion in overseeing
discovery and protecting the parties that come before it. The order entered
here accomplishes the discovery of the sought after medical records in the
most expeditious and practical way possible, by having the records released
directly to the Respondents. It burdens judicial resources the least, and does
the most to ensure full disclosure so that defendants in personal injury
litigation can folly and fairly litigate their liability. In fact, orders such as this
are regularly entered by trial courts, and acquiesced to by plaintiffs.
Furthermore, ordering the Petitioners to sign written authorizations for the
release of medical records does not necessitate a violation of their right to
protect unrelated, undiscoverable matters. A party, such as the Petitioners,
who objects to the disclosure of parts of a medical record is free to request that
the entire medical record be submitted to the trial court to review in camera.
The trial court may then excise or redact the non-discoverable material, if any,
prior to releasing the records to the party seeking them.
Rojas, at 857.
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The Rojas court further stated:
We hold that the district court's decision provides the most practical and least
burdensome method for obtaining the records at issue and allows for the
records to be sent in an expeditious, readable, and uncensored fashion.
Equally as important, we find that the procedure for obtaining medical records
from an out-of-state or out-of-country source should be no more burdensome
than the procedure for obtaining the same type of medical records from an instate source.
Id
The Indiana Court of Appeals, in Andreatta v. Hunley, 714 N.E.2d 1154 (Ind. App.
1999), held a trial court was within its discretion when it required a slip and fall plaintiff to
sign authorizations for defendants to obtain plaintiffs out of state medical records regarding
plaintiff s pre and post accident medical treatment. The plaintiff in Andreatta, sought to have
the trial court approve a procedure which would have required plaintiffs medical providers
to make two copies of all the medical records requested by defendants and allow the
plaintiffs counsel to first review the records prior to defendants receiving the records. Only
after plaintiffs counsel reviewed the records, if there was no objection, would the medical
providers send the second copy of the records to defense counsel. If there was an objection
by plaintiff to the records, the medical provider was to segregate the records which were
objectionable and send those records directly to the trial court for an in camera review. Id,
at 1156.
The trial court in Andreatta rejected plaintiffs proposed procedure and determined
that plaintiffs counsel was aware of plaintiff s prior providers and could have obtained a
copy of the records to review by having plaintiff sign an authorization before defendants
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sought these records. In upholding the trial court's denial of plaintiff s proposed procedure,
the Andreatta court stated "They [plaintiffs] urge us to adopt the tortuous procedure of
requiring medical providers to make two copies of all records, number them and send them
to counsel. We decline to impose such a procedure upon medical providers or our trial
courts..."
Further, the Andreatta court, in holding the trial court was within its discretion in
ordering plaintiff to sign medical authorizations for plaintiffs out of state providers, stated:
Generally, matters concerning discovery methods that the trial rules do not
govern are matters for a trial court's exercise of discretion...Because the scope
of discovery is highly dependent on the facts of each case, the fact-sensitive
nature of discovery issues requires a high degree of deference to the decision
of the trial court... We will interfere with the trial court's ruling on discovery
matters only where an abuse of discretion is apparent... An abuse of discretion
occurs only where the trial court's decision is against the logic and
circumstances of the case...
Id. at 1159 (Internal citations omitted).
The Andreatta court determined that, since defendants would be unable to issue a
subpoena to obtain plaintiffs out-of-state medical records, the trial court acted within its
discretion in ordering the plaintiff to sign medical authorizations allowing defendant to
obtain those records.8 Id.
In Price v. Grefco J n c . 543 N.E.2d 521 (111. App. 1989), the Illinois Court of Appeals
upheld a trial court's order requiring a personal injury plaintiff to execute medical
8

The Andreatta court also rejected plaintiffs argument that defendants were
not entitled to obtain her prior medical records because they were protected by the physicianpatient privilege, and stated "When a patient who is a party to a lawsuit places her physical
condition at issue...the patient has impliedly waived the physician-patient privilege as to that
condition." Andreatta, at 1157.
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authorizations permitting a defendant to obtain plaintiffs out-of-state medical records. The
parties in Price agreed that there was no statute or supreme court rule which expressly
authorized a court to order a party to execute such an authorization and neither party
presented any precedential decision by an Illinois Appellate court dealing with this issue. Id.
at 523. The Price court determined that the trial court was within its discretion in ordering
the plaintiff to execute the authorizations for out-of-state records. Id. at 523-524. Further,
after the trial court ordered plaintiff to sign the authorizations, she still refused to do so, and
the trial court dismissed plaintiffs complaint as a sanction for failure to comply with the trial
court's order. The Price court held the trial court was within its discretion in dismissing
plaintiffs lawsuit for failure to execute the authorizations as ordered by the trial court. Id.
at 524.
Likewise, the Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department for the State
of New York, in Singh v. Singh, 51 A.D.3d 770, 771, 857 N.Y.S.2d 707, 708-709 (2008),
held that a trial court properly exercised its discretion in ordering a plaintiff, in an assault and
battery case, to execute authorizations allowing defendants to obtain tax returns filed by
plaintiff and his company where plaintiff was claiming damages for lost earnings. Id. at 771.
Here, the trial court was well within its authority, in overseeing discovery disputes,
to order Rahofy to sign the employment and medical authorizations allowing Defendants to
obtain the records directly from the out-of-state health care providers and employers. The
trial court's Order was consistent with, and in furtherance of, the direction of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure to ensure "just, speedy, and inexpensive" determination of the action. Ut.
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R. Civ. P. 1(a). The procedure outlined by the Court of Appeals' decision imposes a
cumbersome, expensive, time-consuming procedure which undermines the purpose of the
discovery rules.

CONCLUSION
The Utah Court of Appeals erred in expressing the factual background in this case.
Specifically, the Court of Appeals determined Defendants had never made a formal discovery
request for the medical or employment records of Plaintiff. Plaintiff herself conceded in her
brief to the Court of Appeals that "Rule 37 and its requirements were never discussed in
memorandum or argument related to Defendants' Motion to Compel."

Appellant's

(Rahofy's) Brief, p. 28. In point of fact, prior to filing Defendants' Motion to Compel,
Defendants did formally request the disputed records in the Interrogatories and Requests for
Production of Documents served on Plaintiff.
The Court of Appeals also erred in reversing the trial court's Order compelling
Plaintiff to execute authorizations and in setting forth discovery procedures for obtaining
Plaintiffs records from out-of-state third parties. Trial courts have broad discretion in
handling the discovery issues which come before them. The Honorable G. Michael Westfall,
in the present case, after considering the arguments made by Plaintiff, correctly granted
Defendants' Motion to Compel and ruled Defendants are entitled to obtain signed
authorizations for the release of Plaintiff s medical and employment records. The trial court
considered the costs of compelling authorizations compared to incurring the costs of
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retaining counsel in a foreign jurisdiction, filing another suit in a foreign jurisdiction, having
subpoenas served in the foreign jurisdiction, then obtaining the records in the foreign
jurisdiction. The procedure imposed by the Court of Appeals to obtain the out-of-state
medical and employment records is unjust, overly complicated, and unnecessarily expensive.
Finally, the procedure set forth by the Court of Appeals to obtain out-of-state records
is contrary to previous decisions by Utah Appellate courts, as well as courts in other
jurisdictions which have determined a trial court has discretion to order a personal injury
plaintiff to execute records authorizations.
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Tabl

Rule 1. General provisions.
(a) Scope of rules. These rules shall govern the procedure in the courts of the state of Utah
in all actions, suits, and proceedings of a civil nature, whether cognizable at law or in equity,
and in all special statutory proceedings, except as governed by other rules promulgated by this
court or enacted by the Legislature and except as stated in Rule 81. They shall be liberally
construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.
(b) Effective date. These rules shall take effect on January 1, 1950; and thereafter all laws
in conflict therewith shall be of no further force or effect. They govern all proceedings in actions
brought after they take effect and also all further proceedings in actions then pending, except
to the extent that in the opinion of the court their application in a particular action pending when
the rules take effect would not be feasible or would work injustice, in which event the former
procedure applies.
Advisory Committee Notes

Tab 2

Rule 26. General provisions governing discovery.
(a) Required disclosures; Discovery methods.
(a)(1) Initial disclosures. Except in cases exempt under subdivision (a)(2) and except as
otherwise stipulated or directed by order, a party shall, without awaiting a discovery request,
provide to other parties:
(a)(1)(A) the name and, if known, the address and telephone number of each individual
likely to have discoverable information supporting its claims or defenses, unless solely for
impeachment, identifying the subjects of the information;
(a)(1)(B) a copy of, or a description by category and location of, all discoverable
documents, data compilations, electronically stored information, and tangible things in the
possession, custody, or control of the party supporting its claims or defenses, unless solely for
impeachment;
(a)(1)(C) a computation of any category of damages claimed by the disclosing party,
making available for inspection and copying as under Rule 34 all discoverable documents or
other evidentiary material on which such computation is based, including materials bearing on
the nature and extent of injuries suffered; and
(a)(1)(D) for inspection and copying as under Rule 34 any insurance agreement under
which any person carrying on an insurance business may be liable to satisfy part or all of a
judgment which may be entered in the case or to indemnify or reimburse for payments made to
satisfy the judgment.
Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court, the disclosures required
by subdivision (a)(1) shall be made within 14 days after the meeting of the parties under
subdivision (f). Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court, a party
joined after the meeting of the parties shall make these disclosures within 30 days after being
served. A party shall make initial disclosures based on the information then reasonably
available and is not excused from making disclosures because the party has not fully
completed the investigation of the case or because the party challenges the sufficiency of
another party's disclosures or because another party has not made disclosures.
(a)(2) Exemptions.
(a)(2)(A) The requirements of subdivision (a)(1) and subdivision (f) do not apply to actions:
(a)(2)(A)(i) based on contract in which the amount demanded in the pleadings is $20,000 or
less;
(a)(2)(A)(ii) for judicial review of adjudicative proceedings or rule making proceedings of an
administrative agency;
(a)(2)(A)(iii) governed by Rule 65B or Rule 65C;
(a)(2)(A)(iv) to enforce an arbitration award;
(a)(2)(A)(v) for water rights general adjudication under Title 73, Chapter 4; and

(a)(2)(A)(vi) in which any party not admitted to practice law in Utah is not represented by
counsel.
(a)(2)(B) In an exempt action, the matters subject to disclosure under subpart (a)(1) are
subject to discovery under subpart (b).
(a)(3) Disclosure of expert testimony.
(a)(3)(A) A party shall disclose to other parties the identity of any person who may be used
at trial to present evidence under Rules 702, 703, or 705 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
(a)(3)(B) Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court, this disclosure
shall, with respect to a witness who is retained or specially employed to provide expert
testimony in the case or whose duties as an employee of the party regularly involve giving
expert testimony, be accompanied by a written report prepared and signed by the witness or
party. The report shall contain the subject matter on which the expert is expected to testify; the
substance of the facts and opinions to which the expert is expected to testify; a summary of the
grounds for each opinion; the qualifications of the witness, including a list of all publications
authored by the witness within the preceding ten years; the compensation to be paid for the
study and testimony; and a listing of any other cases in which the witness has testified as an
expert at trial or by deposition within the preceding four years.
(a)(3)(C) Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court, the disclosures
required by subdivision (a)(3) shall be made within 30 days after the expiration of fact
discovery as provided by subdivision (d) or, if the evidence is intended solely to contradict or
rebut evidence on the same subject matter identified by another party under paragraph (3)(B),
within 60 days after the disclosure made by the other party.
(a)(4) Pretrial disclosures. A party shall provide to other parties the following information
regarding the evidence that it may present at trial other than solely for impeachment:
(a)(4)(A) the name and, if not previously provided, the address and telephone number of
each witness, separately identifying witnesses the party expects to present and witnesses the
party may call if the need arises;
(a)(4)(B) the designation of witnesses whose testimony is expected to be presented by
means of a deposition and, if not taken stenographically, a transcript of the pertinent portions
of the deposition testimony; and
(a)(4)(C) an appropriate identification of each document or other exhibit, including
summaries of other evidence, separately identifying those which the party expects to offer and
those which the party may offer if the need arises.
Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court, the disclosures required
by subdivision (a)(4) shall be made at least 30 days before trial. Within 14 days thereafter,
unless a different time is specified by the court, a party may serve and file a list disclosing (i)
any objections to the use under Rule 32(a) of a deposition designated by another party under
subparagraph (B) and (ii) any objection, together with the grounds therefor, that may be made
to the admissibility of materials identified under subparagraph (C). Objections not so disclosed,
other than objections under Rules 402 and 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, shall be
deemed waived unless excused by the court for good cause shown.

(a)(5) Form of disclosures. Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the
court, all disclosures under paragraphs (1), (3) and (4) shall be made in writing, signed and
served.
(a)(6) Methods to discover additional matter. Parties may obtain discovery by one or more
of the following methods: depositions upon oral examination or written questions; written
interrogatories; production of documents or things or permission to enter upon land or other
property, for inspection and other purposes; physical and mental examinations; and requests
for admission.
(b) Discovery scope and limits. Unless otherwise limited by order of the court in accordance
with these rules, the scope of discovery is as follows:
(b)(1) In general. Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which
is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action, whether it relates to the claim
or defense of the party seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of any other party,
including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and location of any books,
documents, or other tangible things and the identity and location of persons having knowledge
of any discoverable matter. It is not ground for objection that the information sought will be
inadmissible at the trial if the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence.
(b)(2) A party need not provide discovery of electronically stored information from sources
that the party identifies as not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost. The
party shall expressly make any claim that the source is not reasonably accessible, describing
the source, the nature and extent of the burden, the nature of the information not provided, and
any other information that will enable other parties to assess the claim. On motion to compel
discovery or for a protective order, the party from whom discovery is sought must show that the
information is not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost. If that showing is
made, the court may order discovery from such sources if the requesting party shows good
cause, considering the limitations of subsection (b)(3). The court may specify conditions for the
discovery.
(b)(3) Limitations. The frequency or extent of use of the discovery methods set forth in
Subdivision (a)(6) shall be limited by the court if it determines that:
(b)(3)(A) the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or is obtainable
from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive;
(b)(3)(B) the party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity by discovery in the action
to obtain the information sought; or
(b)(3)(C) the discovery is unduly burdensome or expensive, taking into account the needs
of the case, the amount in controversy, limitations on the parties' resources, and the
importance of the issues at stake in the litigation. The court may act upon its own initiative after
reasonable notice or pursuant to a motion under Subdivision (c).
(b)(4) Trial preparation: Materials. Subject to the provisions of Subdivision (b)(5) of this rule,
a party may obtain discovery of documents and tangible things otherwise discoverable under
Subdivision (b)(1) of this rule and prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for
another party or by or for that other party's representative (including the party's attorney,

consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent) only upon a showing that the party seeking
discovery has substantial need of the materials in the preparation of the case and that the
party is unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by
other means. In ordering discovery of such materials when the required showing has been
made, the court shall protect against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions,
opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or other representative of a party concerning the
litigation.
A party may obtain without the required showing a statement concerning the action or its
subject matter previously made by that party. Upon request, a person not a party may obtain
without the required showing a statement concerning the action or its subject matter previously
made by that person. If the request is refused, the person may move for a court order. The
provisions of Rule 37(a)(4) apply to the award of expenses incurred in relation to the motion.
For purposes of this paragraph, a statement previously made is (A) a written statement signed
or otherwise adopted or approved by the person making it, or (B) a stenographic, mechanical,
electrical, or other recording, or a transcription thereof, which is a substantially verbatim recital
of an oral statement by the person making it and contemporaneously recorded.
(b)(5) Trial preparation: Experts.
(b)(5)(A) A party may depose any person who has been identified as an expert whose
opinions may be presented at trial. If a report is required under subdivision (a)(3)(B), any
deposition shall be conducted within 60 days after the report is provided.
(b)(5)(B) A party may discover facts known or opinions held by an expert who has been
retained or specially employed by another party in anticipation of litigation or preparation for
trial and who is not expected to be called as a witness at trial, only as provided in Rule 35(b) or
upon a showing of exceptional circumstances under which it is impracticable for the party
seeking discovery to obtain facts or opinions on the same subject by other means.
(b)(5)(C) Unless manifest injustice would result,
(b)(5)(C)(i) The court shall require that the party seeking discovery pay the expert a
reasonable fee for time spent in responding to discovery under Subdivision (b)(5) of this rule;
and
(b)(5)(C)(ii) With respect to discovery obtained under Subdivision (b)(5)(A) of this rule the
court may require, and with respect to discovery obtained under Subdivision (b)(5)(B) of this
rule the court shall require, the party seeking discovery to pay the other party a fair portion of
the fees and expenses reasonably incurred by the latter party in obtaining facts and opinions
from the expert.
(b)(6) Claims of Privilege or Protection of Trial Preparation Materials.
(b)(6)(A) Information withheld. When a party withholds information otherwise discoverable
under these rules by claiming that it is privileged or subject to protection as trial preparation
material, the party shall make the claim expressly and shall describe the nature of the
documents, communications, or things not produced or disclosed in a manner that, without
revealing information itself privileged or protected, will enable other parties to assess the
applicability of the privilege or protection.
(b)(6)(B) Information produced. If information is produced in discovery that is subject to a

claim of privilege or of protection as trial-preparation material, the party making the claim
may notify any party that received the information of the claim and the basis for it. After being
notified, a party must promptly return, sequester, or destroy the specified information and any
copies it has and may not use or disclose the information until the claim is resolved. A
receiving party may promptly present the information to the court under seal for a
determination of the claim. If the receiving party disclosed the information before being notified,
it must take reasonable steps to retrieve it. The producing party must preserve the information
until the claim is resolved.
(c) Protective orders. Upon motion by a party or by the person from whom discovery is
sought, accompanied by a certification that the movant has in good faith conferred or
attempted to confer with other affected parties in an effort to resolve the dispute without court
action, and for good cause shown, the court in which the action is pending or alternatively, on
matters relating to a deposition, the court in the district where the deposition is to be taken may
make any order which justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance,
embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense, including one or more of the
following:
(c)(1) that the discovery not be had;
(c)(2) that the discovery may be had only on specified terms and conditions, including a
designation of the time or place;
(c)(3) that the discovery may be had only by a method of discovery other than that selected
by the party seeking discovery;
(c)(4) that certain matters not be inquired into, or that the scope of the discovery be limited
to certain matters;
(c)(5) that discovery be conducted with no one present except persons designated by the
court;
(c)(6) that a deposition after being sealed be opened only by order of the court;
(c)(7) that a trade secret or other confidential research, development, or commercial
information not be disclosed or be disclosed only in a designated way;
(c)(8) that the parties simultaneously file specified documents or information enclosed in
sealed envelopes to be opened as directed by the court.
If the motion for a protective order is denied in whole or in part, the court may, on such
terms and conditions as are just, order that any party or person provide or permit discovery.
The provisions of Rule 37(a)(4) apply to the award of expenses incurred in relation to the
motion.
(d) Sequence and timing of discovery. Except for cases exempt under subdivision (a)(2),
except as authorized under these rules, or unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or
ordered by the court, a party may not seek discovery from any source before the parties have
met and conferred as required by subdivision (f). Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or
ordered by the court, fact discovery shall be completed within 240 days after the first answer is
filed. Unless the court upon motion, for the convenience of parties and witnesses and in the
interests of justice, orders otherwise, methods of discovery may be used in any sequence and

the fact that a party is conducting discovery, whether by deposition or otherwise, shall not
operate to delay any other party's discovery.
(e) Supplementation of responses. A party who has made a disclosure under subdivision
(a) or responded to a request for discovery with a response is under a duty to supplement the
disclosure or response to include information thereafter acquired if ordered by the court or in
the following circumstances:
(e)(1) A party is under a duty to supplement at appropriate intervals disclosures under
subdivision (a) if the party learns that in some material respect the information disclosed is
incomplete or incorrect and if the additional or corrective information has not otherwise been
made known to the other parties during the discovery process or in writing. With respect to
testimony of an expert from whom a report is required under subdivision (a)(3)(B) the duty
extends both to information contained in the report and to information provided through a
deposition of the expert.
(e)(2) A party is under a duty seasonably to amend a prior response to an interrogatory,
request for production, or request for admission if the party learns that the response is in some
material respect incomplete or incorrect and if the additional or corrective information has not
otherwise been made known to the other parties during the discovery process or in writing.
(f) Discovery and scheduling conference.
The following applies to all cases not exempt under subdivision (a)(2), except as otherwise
stipulated or directed by order.
(f)(1) The parties shall, as soon as practicable after commencement of the action, meet in
person or by telephone to discuss the nature and basis of their claims and defenses, to
discuss the possibilities for settlement of the action, to make or arrange for the disclosures
required by subdivision (a)(1), to discuss any issues relating to preserving discoverable
information and to develop a stipulated discovery plan. Plaintiffs counsel shall schedule the
meeting. The attorneys of record shall be present at the meeting and shall attempt in good
faith to agree upon the discovery plan.
(f)(2) The plan shall include:
(f)(2)(A) what changes should be made in the timing, form, or requirement for disclosures
under subdivision (a), including a statement as to when disclosures under subdivision (a)(1)
were made or will be made;
(f)(2)(B) the subjects on which discovery may be needed, when discovery should be
completed, whether discovery should be conducted in phases and whether discovery should
be limited to particular issues;
(f)(2)(C) any issues relating to preservation, disclosure or discovery of electronically stored
information, including the form or forms in which it should be produced;
(f)(2)(D) any issues relating to claims of privilege or of protection as trial-preparation
material, including - if the parties agree on a procedure to assert such claims after production whether to ask the court to include their agreement in an order;
(f)(2)(E) what changes should be made in the limitations on discovery imposed under these
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rules, and what other limitations should be imposed;
(f)(2)(F) the deadline for filing the description of the factual and legal basis for allocating
fault to a non-party and the identity of the non-party; and
(f)(2)(G) any other orders that should be entered by the court.
(f)(3) Plaintiffs counsel shall submit to the court within 14 days after the meeting and in any
event no more than 60 days after the first answer is filed a proposed form of order in
conformity with the parties' stipulated discovery plan. The proposed form of order shall also
include each of the subjects listed in Rule 16(b)(1)-(8), except that the date or dates for pretrial
conferences, final pretrial conference and trial shall be scheduled with the court or may be
deferred until the close of discovery. If the parties are unable to agree to the terms of a
discovery plan or any part thereof, the plaintiff shall and any party may move the court for entry
of a discovery order on any topic on which the parties are unable to agree. Unless otherwise
ordered by the court, the presumptions established by these rules shall govern any subject not
included within the parties' stipulated discovery plan.
(f)(4) Any party may request a scheduling and management conference or order under
Rule 16(b).
(f)(5) A party joined after the meeting of the parties is bound by the stipulated discovery
plan and discovery order, unless the court orders on stipulation or motion a modification of the
discovery plan and order. The stipulation or motion shall be filed within a reasonable time after
joinder.
(g) Signing of discovery requests, responses, and objections. Every request for discovery
or response or objection thereto made by a party shall be signed by at least one attorney of
record or by the party if the party is not represented, whose address shall be stated. The
signature of the attorney or party constitutes a certification that the person has read the
request, response, or objection and that to the best of the person's knowledge, information,
and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is: (1) consistent with these rules and warranted
by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing
law; (2) not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary
delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation; and (3) not unreasonable or unduly
burdensome or expensive, given the needs of the case, the discovery already had in the case,
the amount in controversy, and the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation. If a
request, response, or objection is not signed, it shall be stricken unless it is signed promptly
after the omission is called to the attention of the party making the request, response, or
objection, and a party shall not be obligated to take any action with respect to it until it is
signed.
If a certification is made in violation of the rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own
initiative, shall impose upon the person who made the certification, the party on whose behalf
the request, response, or objection is made, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may
include an order to pay the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the
violation, including a reasonable attorney fee.
(h) Deposition where action pending in another state. Any party to an action or proceeding
in another state may take the deposition of any person within this state, in the same manner
and subject to the same conditions and limitations as if such action or proceeding were

pending in this state, provided that in order to obtain a subpoena the notice of the taking of
such deposition shall be filed with the clerk of the court of the county in which the person
whose deposition is to be taken resides or is to be served, and provided further that all matters
arising during the taking of such deposition which by the rules are required to be submitted to
the court shall be submitted to the court in the county where the deposition is being taken.
(i) Filing.
(i)(1) Unless otherwise ordered by the court, a party shall not file disclosures or requests for
discovery with the court, but shall file only the original certificate of service stating that the
disclosures or requests for discovery have been served on the other parties and the date of
service. Unless otherwise ordered by the court, a party shall not file a response to a request for
discovery with the court, but shall file only the original certificate of service stating that the
response has been served on the other parties and the date of service. Except as provided in
Rule 30(f)(1), Rule 32 or unless otherwise ordered by the court, depositions shall not be filed
with the court.
(i)(2) A party filing a motion under subdivision (c) or a motion under Rule 37(a) shall attach
to the motion a copy of the request for discovery or the response which is at issue.
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Rule 33. Interrogatories to parties.
(a) Availability; procedures for use. Without leave of court or written stipulation, any party may
serve upon any other party written interrogatories, not exceeding 25 in number including all
discrete subparts, to be answered by the party served or, if the party served is a public or private
corporation, a partnership, an association, or a governmental agency, by any officer or agent, who
shall furnish such information as is available to the party. Leave to serve additional interrogatories
shall be granted to the extent consistent with the principles of Rule 26(b)(3). Without leave of
court or written stipulation, interrogatories may not be served before the time specified in Rule 26
(d).
(b) Answers and objections.
(b)(1) Each interrogatory shall be answered separately and fully in writing under oath, unless it is
objected to, in which event the objecting party shall state the reasons for objection and shall
answer to the extent the interrogatory is not objectionable.
(b)(2) The answers are to be signed by the person making them, and the objections signed by the
attorney making them.
(b)(3) The party upon whom the interrogatories have been served shall serve a copy of the
answers and objections, if any, within 30 days after the service of the interrogatories. A shorter or
longer time may be ordered by the court or, in the absence of such an order, agreed to in writing
by the parties subject to Rule 29.
(b)(4) All grounds for an objection to an interrogatory shall be stated with specificity. Any ground
not stated in a timely objection is waived unless the partyfs failure to object is excused by the court
for good cause shown.
(b)(5) The party submitting the interrogatories may move for an order under Rule 37(a) with
respect to any objection to or other failure to answer an interrogatory.
(c) Scope; use at trial. Interrogatories may relate to any matters which can be inquired into under
Rule 26(b), and the answers may be used to the extent permitted by the Rules of Evidence.
An interrogatory otherwise proper is not necessarily objectionable merely because an answer to
the interrogatory involves an opinion or contention that relates to fact or the application of law to
fact, but the court may order that such an interrogatory need not be answered until after designated
discovery has been completed or until a pretrial conference or other later time.
(d) Option to produce business records. Where the answer to an interrogatory may be derived or
ascertained from the business records, including electronically stored information, of the party
upon whom the interrogatory has been served or from an examination, audit, or inspection of such
business records, including a compilation, abstract, or summary thereof and the burden of deriving
or ascertaining the answer is substantially the same for the party serving the interrogatory as for
the party served, it is a sufficient answer to such interrogatory to specify the records from which
the answer may be derived or ascertained and to afford to the party serving the interrogatory
reasonable opportunity to examine, audit, or inspect such records and to make copies,
compilations, abstracts, or summaries. A specification shall be in sufficient detail to permit the
interrogating party to locate and to identify, as readily as can the party served, the records from
which the answer may be ascertained.
Advisory Committee Notes
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Rule 3 4 . Production of documents and things and entry upon land for inspection and other purposes.
(a) Scope. Any party may serve on any other party a request
(a)(1) to produce and permit the party making the request, or someone acting on his behalf, to inspect, copy, test or sample
any designated documents or electronically stored information (including writings, drawings, graphs, charts, photographs,
sound recordings, images, and other data or data compilations stored in any medium from which information can be
obtained, translated, if necessary, by the respondent into reasonably usable form), or to inspect, copy, test or sample any
designated tangible things which constitute or contain matters within the scope of Rule 26(b) and which are in the
possession, custody or control of the party upon whom the request is served; or
(a)(2) to permit entry upon designated land or other property in the possession or control of the party upon whom the
request is served for the purpose of inspection and measuring, surveying, photographing, testing, or sampling the property
or any designated object or operation thereon, within the scope of Rule 26(b).
(b) Procedure.
(b)(1) The request shall set forth the items to be inspected either by individual item or by category, and describe each item
and category with reasonable particularity. The request shall specify a reasonable time, place, and manner of making the
inspection and performing the related acts. The request may specify the form or forms in which electronically stored
information is to be produced. Without leave of court or written stipulation, a request may not be served before the time
specified in Rule 26(d).
(b)(2) The party upon whom the request is served shall serve a written response within 30 days after the service of the
request. A shorter or longer time may be directed by the court or, in the absence of such an order, agreed to in writing by
the parties, subject to Rule 29. The response shall state, with respect to each item or category, that inspection and related
activities will be permitted as requested, unless the request is objected to, including an objection to the requested form or
forms for producing electronically stored information, stating the reasons for the objection. If objection is made to part of an
item or category, the part shall be specified and inspection permitted of the remaining parts. If objection is made to the
requested form or forms for producing electronically stored information — or if no form was specified in the request — the
responding party must state the form or forms it intends to use. The party submitting the request may move for an order
under Rule 37(a) with respect to any objection to or other failure to respond to the request or any part thereof, or any
failure to permit inspection as requested.
(b)(3) Unless the parties otherwise agree or the court otherwise orders:
(b)(3)(A) a party who produces documents for inspection shall produce them as they are kept in the usual course of
business or shall organize and label them to correspond with the categories in the request;
(b)(3)(B) if a request does not specify the form or forms for producing electronically stored information, a responding party
must produce the information in a form or forms in which it is ordinarily maintained or in a form or forms that are
reasonably usable; and
(b)(3)(C) a party need not produce the same electronically stored information in more than one form.
(c) Persons not parties. This rule does not preclude an independent action against a person not a party for production of
documents and things and permission to enter upon land.
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Rule 3 7 . Failure to make or cooperate in discovery; sanctions.
(a) Motion for order compelling discovery. A party, upon reasonable notice to other parties and all persons affected thereby,
may apply for an order compelling discovery as follows:
(a)(1) Appropriate court. An application for an order to a party may be made to the court in which the action is pending, or,
on matters relating to a deposition, to the court in the district where the deposition is being taken. An application for an
order to a deponent who is not a party shall be made to the court in the district where the deposition is being taken.
(a)(2) Motion.
(a)(2)(A) If a party fails to make a disclosure required by Rule 26(a), any other party may move to compel disclosure and
for appropriate sanctions. The motion must include a certification that the movant has in good faith conferred or attempted
to confer with the party not making the disclosure in an effort to secure the disclosure without court action.
(a)(2)(B) If a deponent fails to answer a question propounded or submitted under Rule 30 or 3 1 , or a corporation or other
entity fails to make a designation under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a), or a party fails to answer an interrogatory submitted under
Rule 33, or if a party, in response to a request for inspection submitted under Rule 34, fails to respond that inspection will
be permitted as requested or fails to permit inspection as requested, the discovering party may move for an order
compelling an answer, or a designation, or an order compelling inspection in accordance with the request. The motion must
include a certification that the movant has in good faith conferred or attempted to confer with the person or party failing to
make the discovery in an effort to secure the information or material without court action. When taking a deposition on oral
examination, the proponent of the question may complete or adjourn the examination before applying for an order.
(a)(3) Evasive or incomplete disclosure, answer, or response. For purposes of this subdivision an evasive or incomplete
disclosure, answer, or response is to be treated as a failure to disclose, answer, or respond.
(a)(4) Expenses and sanctions.
(a)(4)(A) If the motion is granted, or if the disclosure or requested discovery is provided after the motion was filed, the
court shall, after opportunity for hearing, require the party or deponent whose conduct necessitated the motion or the party
or attorney advising such conduct or both of them to pay to the moving party the reasonable expenses incurred in obtaining
the order, including attorney fees, unless the court finds that the motion was filed without the movant's first making a good
faith effort to obtain the disclosure or discovery without court action, or that the opposing party's nondisclosure, response,
or objection was substantially justified, or that other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.
(a)(4)(B) If the motion is denied, the court may enter any protective order authorized under Rule 26(c) and shall, after
opportunity for hearing, require the moving party or the attorney or both of them to pay to the party or deponent who
opposed the motion the reasonable expenses incurred in opposing the motion, including attorney fees, unless the court finds
that the making of the motion was substantially justified or that other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.
(a)(4)(C) I f the motion is granted in part and denied in part, the court may enter any protective order authorized under Rule
26(c) and may, after opportunity for hearing, apportion the reasonable expenses incurred in relation to the motion among
the parties and persons in a just manner.
(b) Failure to comply with order.
(b)(1) Sanctions by court in district where deposition is taken. If a deponent fails to be sworn or to answer a question after
being directed to do so by the court in the district in which the deposition is being taken, the failure may be considered a
contempt of that court.
(b)(2) Sanctions by court in which action is pending. If a party fails to obey an order entered under Rule 16(b) or if a party
or an officer, director, or managing agent of a party or a person designated under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a) to testify on behalf
of a party fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery, including an order made under Subdivision (a) of this rule or
Rule 3 5 , , unless the court finds that the failure was substantially justified, the court in which the action is pending may take
such action in regard to the failure as are just, including the following:
(b)(2)(A) deem the matter or any other designated facts to be established for the purposes of the action in accordance with
the claim of the party obtaining the order;
(b)(2)(B)prohibit the disobedient party from supporting or opposing designated claims or defenses or from introducing
designated matters in evidence;
(b)(2)(C) strike pleadings or parts thereof, stay further proceedings until the order is obeyed, dismiss the action or
proceeding or any part thereof, or render judgment by default against the disobedient party;
(b)(2)(D) order the party or the attorney to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney fees, caused by the failure;
(b)(2)(E) treat the failure to obey an order, other than an order to submit to a physical or mental examination, as contempt
of court; and
(b)(2)(F) instruct the jury regarding an adverse inference.
(c) Expenses on failure to admit. If a party fails to admit the genuineness of any document or the truth of any matter as
requested under Rule 36, and if the party requesting the admissions thereafter proves the genuineness of the document or

the truth of the matter, the party requesting the admissions may apply to the court for an order requiring the other party to
pay the reasonable expenses incurred in making that proof, including reasonable attorney fees. The court shall make the
order unless it finds that (1) the request was held objectionable pursuant to Rule 36(a), or (2) the admission sought was of
no substantial importance, or (3) the party failing to admit had reasonable ground to believe that he might prevail on the
matter, or (4) there was other good reason for the failure to admit.
(d) Failure of party to attend at own deposition or serve answers to interrogatories or respond to request for inspection. If a
party or an officer, director, or managing agent of a party or a person designated under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a) to testify on
behalf of a party fails (1) to appear before the officer who is to take the deposition, after being served with a proper notice,
or (2) to serve answers or objections to interrogatories submitted under Rule 33, after proper service of the interrogatories,
or (3) to serve a written response to a request for inspection submitted under Rule 34, after proper service of the request,
the court. on motion may take any action authorized by Subdivision (b)(2).
The failure to act described in this subdivision may not be excused on the ground that the discovery sought is objectionable
unless the party failing to act has applied for a protective order as provided by Rule 26(c).
(e) Failure to participate in the framing of a discovery plan. If a party or attorney fails to participate in good faith in the
framing of a discovery plan by agreement as is required by Rule 26(f), the court on motion may take any action authorized
by Subdivision (b)(2).
(f) Failure to disclose. If a party fails to disclose a witness, document or other material as required by Rule 26(a) or Rule 26
(e)(1), or to amend a prior response to discovery as required by Rule 26(e)(2), that party shall not be permitted to use the
witness, document or other material at any hearing unless the failure to disclose is harmless or the party shows good cause
for the failure to disclose. In addition to or in lieu of this sanction, the court on motion may take any action authorized by
Subdivision (b)(2).
(g) Failure to preserve evidence. Nothing in this rule limits the inherent power of the court to take any action authorized by
Subdivision (b)(2) if a party destroys, conceals, alters, tampers with or fails to preserve a document, tangible item,
electronic data or other evidence in violation of a duty. Absent exceptional circumstances, a court may not impose sanctions
under these rules on a party for failing to provide electronically stored information lost as a result of the routine, good-faith
operation of an electronic information system.
Advisory Committee Notes

Tab 6

Rule 51. Disposition of petition for writ of certiorari.
(a) Order after consideration. After consideration of the documents distributed pursuant to
Rule 50, the Supreme Court will enter an order denying the petition or granting the petition in
whole or in part. The order shall be decided summarily, shall be without oral argument, and
shall not constitute a decision on the merits. The clerk shall not issue a formal writ unless
directed by the Supreme Court.
(b) Grant of petition.
(b)(1) Whenever an order granting a petition for a writ of certiorari is entered, the Clerk of
the Supreme Court forthwith shall notify the Clerk of the Court of Appeals and counsel of
record.
(b)(2) If the record has not previously been filed, the Clerk of the Supreme Court shall
request the clerk of the court with custody of the record to certify it and transmit it to the
Supreme Court.
(b)(3) The clerk shall file the record and give notice to the parties of the date on which it
was filed and the date on which petitioner's brief is due.
(b)(4) Rules 24 through 31 shall govern briefs, argument, and disposition of the petition for
writ of certiorari. In applying Rules 24 through 31, the petitioner shall stand in the place of the
appellant and the respondent in the place of the appellee. In lieu of providing the citation or
statements required by Rules 24(a)(5)(A) and (B), the statement of the issues presented for
review as required by Rule 24(a)(5) shall include, for each issue, a statement and citation
showing that the issue was presented in the petition for certiorari or fairly included therein.
(c) Denial of petition. Whenever a petition for a writ of certiorari is denied, an order to that
effect will be entered, and the Clerk of the Supreme Court forthwith will notify the Court of
Appeals and counsel of record.
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106II Establishment, Organization, and Proced-

P>
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Sabrina RAHOFY, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
Lynn STEADMAN, an individual; and Steadman
Land & Livestock, LLC, Defendants and Appellees.
No. 20090512-CA.
Dec. 9,2010.
Background: Automobile accident plaintiff appealed decision of the District Court, Cedar City
Department, G. Michael Westfall, J., granting defendants1 motion to compel production of documents relating to medical treatment she received for
the injuries she allegedly suffered as a result of the
accident.
Holding: The Court of Appeals, Christiansen, J.,
held that order granting defendants' motion to compel was improper.

ure
10611(F) Rules of Court and Conduct of
Business
106k85 Operation and Effect of Rules
106k85(3) k. Construction and application of particular rules. Most Cited Cases
The interpretation of a rule of procedure is a
question of law..
[3] Courts 106 €==>85(2)
106 Courts
106II Establishment, Organization, and Procedure
10611(F) Rules of Court and Conduct of
Business
106k85 Operation and Effect of Rules
106k85(2) k. Construction and application of rules in general. Most Cited Cases
The Court of Appeals will interpret court rules
according to their plain language.

Reversed and remanded.
[4] Pretrial Procedure 307A €^=>402
West Headnotes
[1] Appeal and E r r o r 30 € ^ > 9 6 1
30 Appeal and Error
30XVI Review
30XVI(H) Discretion of Lower Court
30k961 k. Depositions, affidavits, or discovery. Most Cited Cases
The Court of Appeals reviews the district
court's decision to grant or deny a motion to compel
discovery under the abuse of discretion standard,
and the Court of Appeals will not find abuse of discretion absent an erroneous conclusion of law or
where there is no evidentiary basis for the trial
court's ruling.
[2] Courts 106 €=>85(3)
106 Courts

307A Pretrial Procedure
307AH Depositions and Discovery
307AU(E) Production of Documents and
Things and Entry on Land
307AH(E)4 Proceedings
307Ak402 k. Time for application;
condition of cause. Most Cited Cases
Pretrial Procedure 307A €=5403
307 A Pretrial Procedure
307AH Depositions and Discovery
307AH(E) Production of Documents and
Things and Entry on Land
307AH(E)4 Proceedings
307Ak403 k. Request, notice, or motion and response or objection. Most Cited Cases
Order compelling defendants' requests for production of automobile accident plaintiffs medical
and employment records before defendants had
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formally requested the documents was abuse of discretion; defendants did not establish that they
served plaintiff with a document request in compliance with rule authorizing production of documents, they did not describe the items requested
"with reasonable particularity," but instead broadly
requested every document contained in plaintiffs
medical and employment records, they did not attempt to establish that the documents being requested were in plaintiffs "possession, custody or control", and without circumventing the discovery
rules, they could have accessed the requested records through power of subpoena. Rules Civ.Proc.,
Rules 34,37.
[5] Pretrial Procedure 307A €=^>24
307A Pretrial Procedure
307All Depositions and Discovery
307AII(A) Discovery in General
307Ak24 k. Discovery methods and procedure. Most Cited Cases
Defendants must establish their entitlement to
production of documents using the proper procedures. Rules CivJProc., Rules 34,37.
[6] Pretrial Procedure 307Aj€>^334
307A Pretrial Procedure
307AH Depositions and Discovery
307AH(E) Production of Documents and
Things and Entry on Land
307AH(E)1 In General
307Ak334 k. Persons subject. Most
Cited Cases

third party, the subpoena procedure can be used to
obtain those documents and documents located in
another state may be obtained by utilizing the subpoena procedure in that state. Rules Civ.Proc., Rule
45(a)(l)(C)(iii).
[7] Pretrial Procedure 307A € ^ > 2 4
307A Pretrial Procedure
307All Depositions and Discovery
307AU(A) Discovery in General
307Ak24 k. Discovery methods and procedure. Most Cited Cases
If a party objects to informal methods of discovery, the party requesting the documents must
take steps pursuant to recognized procedural rules
to obtain the relief allowed in the rules of discovery. Rules Civ.Proc, Rules 34,37.
[8] Pretrial Procedure 307A €=>24
307A Pretrial Procedure
307All Depositions and Discovery
307AH(A) Discovery in General
307Ak24 k. Discovery methods and procedure. Most Cited Cases
The discovery process^ is^jnteotionally broad
and is designed to be simple and efficient. Rules
CivJProc, Rule 26(b)(1).
*201 Jamis M. Gardner and Thomas W. Seiler,
Provo, for Appellant.
Lowell V. Smith and Trent D. Holgate, Sandy, for
Appellees.

Pretrial Procedure 307A €==>403
307A Pretrial Procedure
307AH Depositions and Discovery
307AII(E) Production of Documents and
Things and Entry on Land
307 AII(E)4 Proceedings
307Ak403 k. Request, notice, or motion and response or objection. Most Cited Cases
When documents are in the possession of a

Before Judges DAVIS, VOROS, and CHRISTIANSEN.
*202 OPINION
CHRISTIANSEN, Judge:
% 1 We granted plaintiff Sabrina Rahofy's interlocutory appeal to determine whether the district
court abused its discretion in granting defendants
Lynn Steadman and Steadman Land & Livestock,
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LLC's motion to compel. We reverse and remand.
BACKGROUND
% 2 This litigation concerns an automobile accident that occurred in 2005 near Cedar City, Utah.
Rahofy provided initial disclosures, which included
the medical information relating to the medical
treatment she received for the injuries she allegedly
suffered as a result of the accident, and answered
Defendants' interrogatories.1^1 Then, in an attempt
to obtain all of Rahofy's past medical and employment records not directly related to the accident,
which were located outside of Utah, Defendants
sent Rahofy two letters in which they requested she
sign authorizations to have the records released directly to Defendants.1^2 When Rahofy refused to
sign the authorizations to release all of her past
medical and employment records, Defendants filed
a motion to compel and argued that she should sign
the authorizations because the records are relevant,
that without the authorizations "Defendants cannot
obtain the required information," and that the records are not privileged because Rahofy has put her
medical and employment histories at issue.1*13
FNL Although Rahofy's initial interrogatory answers did not contain the addresses
of some of her former employers, she later
provided those addresses to Defendants.
FN2. Defendants requested that Rahofy
sign general releases to send to all of the
medical providers she had seen in the last
twenty years and all of Rahofy's prior employers so that Defendants could obtain
directly from those providers and prior employers all of Rahofy's medical and employment records.
FN3. In their motion to compel, Defendants also argued that Rahofy had not fully
responded to a rule 33 interrogatory asking
for the addresses of Rahofy's former employers. However, Defendants had overlooked the fact that Rahofy had later
provided this additional information. Thus,

Defendants acknowledged in their reply
brief for their motion to compel that the interrogatory had been completely answered.
Had Rahofy not answered the interrogatory, the district court, in its discretion,
could have properly entertained Defendants' motion to compel and could have required Rahofy to answer the interrogatory.
See Utah R. Civ. P. 33, 37(a)(2)(B).
However, because a complete answer had
been given to Defendants before the district court addressed the motion, the motion to compel was not based on an insufficient interrogatory answer and is, therefore, not an issue on appeal.
f 3 Rahofy responded to Defendants' motion by
arguing that she had completely answered all formal discovery requests; that the request to sign the
authorizations was an informal request; that had the
request been made as a production of documents request, Rahofy "would object [to the request] as
vague, overbroad, and not reasonably calculated to
lead to the discovery of admissible evidence"; that
Defendants failed to prove the records were in
Rahofy's possession, which was required for her to
produce them; that the medical records were privileged; and that neither the medical nor the employment records were relevant in this case.
% 4 After a hearing, the district court granted
Defendants' motion to compel. Concerning
Rahofy's employment records, the district court determined that defendants may access any employment records" and ordered Rahofy to "execute authorizations for all employment records and return
the signed authorizations to the Defendants" within
eleven days after the order was filed.13*44 With regard to Rahofy's medical records, the district court
ordered Rahofy, within eleven days,
FN4. In fact, the district court ordered
Rahofy
"to execute a release so
[D]efendant[s] can access any employment
records that they want to access with regard to [Rahofy] back to when she was
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selling ... Girl Scout cookies when she was
nine-years old.... [Defendants] can access
... any employment records they want."
to provide to the Court and to the Defendants a
complete list of every medical record [Rahofy]
has ever had generated on her behalf, including
the date, medical provider, medical problem
presented and medical service providedJfP15!
The list provided*203 to the Court and to the Defendants must be accurate, or the Court may impose sanctions. [Rahofy] is to designate which of
the medical records listed, [she] believes are not
relevant to this case and therefore, subject to privacy.
FN5. The district court placed the burden
on Rahofy to obtain and disclose all of the
requested medical records, even those records that were not in Rahofy's possession:
[I]f [Rahofy] doesn't have the copy of
the record in [her] possession, ... [she]
simply gather[s] the information by calling and talking to the healthcare provider, then [she] is required to sign a release to release those records.... I'm going to throw the onus of the burden back
on [Rahofy] with regard to those medical
records, and require that [she] gather the
information....
Moreover, the district court placed no
limits on how far back Rahofy must go
to obtain records or what type of medical
records she was to provide:
You have 30 days to provide the list of
every visit, and as I indicated—what was
it, every visit, the date of every visit, the
medical problem that was presented and
the service that was provided.... That
may very well require that she admit that
she had hemorrhoids and went to a doctor for it....

Defendants shall be entitled to receive medical
records for those records to which [Rahofy] does
not claim a privacy privilege. [Rahofy) is either
to disclose those specific records directly to Defendants, or, if [Rahofy] does not have a copy of
a specific record in her possession, [she] is required to sign an authorization for release to release those specific records.
Regarding [Rahofy]'s designation of health
care providers which [she] claims are privileged
and irrelevant to the issues raised in this litigation, Defendants have 30 days after receipt of the
list of health care providers which [Rahofy]
claims are irrelevant and subject to privacy, to
object to [Rahofy]'s designation by filing a motion with the Court
In the event that Defendants file a motion with
the Court, [Rahofy] will have an additional 30
days to obtain ail such records from the various
health care providers and submit all such records
to the Court. The Court will review these records
in camera, and make a determination as to
whether or not they are to be disclosed.
(Emphasis in original.) We granted Rahofy's
interlocutory appeal to determine if" the ~districf
court abused its discretion in entertaining and
granting Defendants' motion to compel.
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
f 5 Rahofy challenges the district court's order
that granted Defendants' motion to compel. More
specifically, Rahofy argues that because Defendants did not formally request the medical and employment records pursuant to rule 34 of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, a motion to compel,
which requires a formal request, was not proper.
Moreover, Rahofy argues that the district court abused its discretion in granting the motion to compel
because the records and information sought were
not relevant, were privileged, and were not in her
possession.1^6
FN6. Both Rahofy and Defendants argue
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about the relevance and privileged status
of the requested records. While these substantive issues may eventually need to be
determined, we review only whether the
proper procedures were followed to entitle
Defendants to a motion to compel the production of those items in the first place.
Defendants provided very little legal or
factual arguments, either at the district
court or on appeal, regarding whether they
followed the proper procedures pursuant to
rules 34 and 37 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. Because we determine that Defendants did not follow the proper procedures, we do not reach the merits of the other issues Rahofy raises on appeal.

that the general purpose of discovery is 'to remove
elements of surprise or trickery so the parties and
the court can determine the facts and resolve the issues as directly, fairly and expeditiously as possible.' " Cannon, 2005 UT App 352, \ 8, 121 P.3d
74 (quoting Ellis v. Gilbert, 19 Utah 2d 189, 429
P.2d 39, 40 (1967)). "[T]he purpose of the rules of
civil procedure pertaining to discovery 'is to make
procedure as simple and efficient as possible by
eliminating any useless ritual, undue rigidities or
technicalities....' " Id (citation omitted). Although
the rules expressly allow parties to agree to informal discovery procedures, see Utah R. Civ. P. 29(2),
the discovery rules, in the absence of such an agreement, set forth a procedure to effectuate an efficient
discovery process.

[1][2][3] f 6 We review the district court's decision to grant or deny a motion to compel under
the abuse of discretion standard. See Cannon v. Salt
Lake Reg'l Med. Or., Inc., 2005 UT App 352, f 7,
121 P.3d 74. "[W]e 'will not find abuse of discretion absent an erroneous conclusion of law or
where there is no evidentiary basis for the trial
court's ruling.' " Id (citation omitted). "(T]he interpretation of a rule of procedure is a question of
law," Brown v. Glover, 2000 UT 89, f 15, 16 P.3d
540, and "[w]e interpret court rules ... according to
their plain language," Staley v. Jolles, 2010 UT 19,
1 14, 230 P.3d 1007 (internal quotation marks omitted). See also Arbogast Family Trust v. River
Crossings, LLC, 2010 UT 40, f 18, 238 P.3d 1035
("When we interpret a procedural rule, we do so according to our general rules of statutory construction.").

f 8 The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allow a
trial court to grant a motion to compel discovery,
see id. R. 37(d), if a party has not adequately responded to a discovery request made in the form of
interrogatories, see id R. 33, or a request for production of documents, see id R. 34. See also Toma
v. Weatherford, 846 F.2d 58, 60 (10th Cir.1988)
(interpreting substantially similar federal rule 37
and stating that " Rule 37(a)(2) gives a requesting
party under Rules 33 or 34 a specific remedy for
failure to answer interrogatories or requests for production: a motion for an order compelling an answer").

*204 ANALYSIS
% 1 The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provide
that "[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any
matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the sur>
ject matter involved in the pending action." Utah R.
Civ. P. 26(b)(1). The rules outline a procedure
through which parties involved in litigation can obtain a broad range of discoverable items. See, e.g.,
id R. 33, 34. 'The Utah Supreme Court has stated

% 9 Rule 34 requires that a party requesting
documents must serve the request, which describes
"with reasonable particularity" the item or items requested, Utah R. Civ. P. 34(b)(1), and that the requested documents must be "in the possession, custody or control of the party upon whom the request
is served," id. R. 34(a)(1). Rule 34 also allows the
party receiving the request to make proper objections if the receiving party believes that the documents are protected. See id R. 34(b)(2). Any objections must be specific and made within thirty days.
See id. Furthermore, all requests, responses, and
objections must be signed by an attorney certifying
that the request is made in compliance with Utah's
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laws and rules, that the request is not "for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation," and that the request is "not unreasonable
or unduly burdensome or expensive, given the
needs of the case." ^ Id. R. 26(g).
FN7. One party may question the motives
of the other party's refusal to produce documents as an attempt to hide discoverable
information. However, when the rules of
procedure are followed, an attorney's signature certifies that the objection is made
for a proper purpose. See Utah R. Civ. P.
26(g). This allows the trial court to impose
sanctions if the objection or delay was improper. See id. By sending letters rather
than a formal document request, not only
did Defendants not have to certify that the
request was made for a proper purpose, but
Rahofy's objections were also not certified
as being for a proper purpose. Cf. Barnard
v. Mansell, 2009 UT App 298, \ 8, 221
P.3d 874 (mem.) (discussing the different
implications of signing a motion for sanctions as opposed to signing a warning letter).
[4] f 10 The parties agree that Defendants requested Rahofy's medical and employment records
through letters.™8 Defendants did not establish
before the district court that the letters in which
they requested the authorizations be signed were
valid requests for documents under rule 34 of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. First, Defendants
did not establish, or even attempt to establish, before the district court that they *205 served Rahofy
with a document request in compliance with the
rule, see id. R. 34(a)(1). On appeal, Defendants
suggest that the letters were properly served, but no
record cite or legal authority was presented to establish this claim. Second, Defendants did not describe the items requested "with reasonable particularity," id. R. 34(b)(1), but instead broadly requested every document contained in Rahofy's medical

and employment records. Finally, Defendants did
not even attempt to establish before the district
court that the documents being requested were in
Rahofy's "possession, custody or control." Id. R.
34(a)(1). In fact, Defendants have consistently acknowledged, and the district court likewise acknowledged in its order, that some of these documents were not in Rahofy's possession but in the
possession of people or entities located outside of
Utah. Therefore we conclude that the district court
abused its discretion by granting the motion to
compel before Defendants had formally requested
the documents under the rules.™9
FN8. We note that the record contains Defendants' certificate of service for their request for production of documents from
Rahofy. However, the actual request,
which presumably contained a list of documents requested that did not include the
documents subsequently requested by their
letters, is not part of the record. Nevertheless, neither party claims that Defendants
requested that Rahofy sign the medical and
employment authorizations other than
through the letters. Therefore, we consider
only whether Defendants' letters satisfied
the requirements of rule 34.
FN9. We do not separately analyze rule 33
because Defendants were clearly requesting that Rahofy facilitate the production of
documents, which request would not fall
under rule 33 but, rather, under rule 34.
[5] \ 11 Defendants attempted to avoid the requirements of rules 34 and 37 by arguing that the
authorizations were the only way to access certain
records because those records are located outside of
Utah. While ultimately they may be entitled to such
records,***10 Defendants must establish their entitlement using the proper procedures. See Brown v.
Glover, 2000 UT 89, \ 30, 16 P.3d 540 ("[A]n attorney has a responsibility to use the available discovery procedures to diligently represent her client.
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provide the
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means to do this.")FN10. Because of the procedural deficiencies in this case, we make no determination
as to whether the medical and employment
records are relevant or privileged. We also
need not make any determination as to the
appropriate method for obtaining authorizations for release of records except as
stated herein.
[6] f 12 When documents are in the possession
of a third party, the subpoena procedure can be
used to obtain those documents. See Utah R. Civ. P.
45(a)(l)(C)(iii)
(stating
that
a
subpoena
"command[s] each person to whom it is directed ...
to copy documents or electronically stored information in the possession, custody or control of that
person and mail or deliver the copies to the party or
attorney responsible for issuing the subpoena before a date certain"); see also id R. 34(c) (stating
that the rule for production of documents "does not
preclude an independent action against a person not
a party for production of documents"). Documents
located in another state may be obtained by utilizing the subpoena procedure in that state. Defendants seek records located in Virginia, Illinois, and
Hawaii. Although these states differ in their procedure, each allows for the subpoenaing of records located in their state.1™1 We readily acknowledge
that to obtain*206 all of the information Defendants
seek they may have to undertake a time-consuming
and expensive process. However, because Defendants could have accessed the requested records
without circumventing the discovery rules, the district court abused its discretion in entertaining and
granting the motion to compel.
FN11. Virginia has adopted the Uniform
Interstate Depositions and Discovery Act,
see Va.Code Ann. §§ 8.01-412.8 to
-412.15 (2010), which Utah has also adopted, see Utah Code Ann. §§ 78B-17-101
to -302 (2008). Virginia allows a subpoena
obtained from another state to be served in
Virginia if "a written statement that the

© 2011 Thomson Reuters. No

law of the foreign jurisdiction grants reciprocal privileges to citizens of [Virginia] for
taking discovery in the jurisdiction that issued the foreign subpoena." Va.Code Ann.
§ 8.01-412.10(A). The subpoena can be
used to produce designated documents and
records, see id § 8.01-412.12, and once a
party files the subpoena, it is "served in
compliance with the applicable statutes o f
Virginia, id § 8.01-412.11. If Rahofy
were to challenge the subpoena, she could
file for a protective order or a motion to
quash or modify the subpoena in a Virginia
court. See id § 8.01-412.13.
Illinois and Hawaii have not adopted the
uniform act. In Illinois, a subpoena may
be issued for an action pending in a court
of another state. See 111. Sup.Ct. R.
204(b). Although the Illinois rule limits
the subpoena power to depositions,
Illinois case law has extended the subpoena power to other discovery allowed
under Illinois rules. See Eskandani v.
Phillips, 61 I11.2d 183, 334 NJE.2d 146,
153 (1975); Mistier v. Mancini, 111
Ill.App.3d 228, 67 IlLDec. 1, 443 N.E.2d
1125, 1128 (1982); see also 735 111.
Comp.
Stat.
Ann.
5/2-1003(a)
(LexisNexis 2010) (determining scope of
discovery in personal injury cases).
Hawaii has a somewhat more onerous
procedure for obtaining a subpoena that
begins with hiring an attorney licensed
in Hawaii for the limited purpose of filing a miscellaneous action. See generally
Haw.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 624-27 to - 28
(LexisNexis 2010); Victoria Bushnell,
How to Take an Out-of-State Deposition, 14 Utah Bar J. 28, 30 (2001). Although subpoenaing out-of-state records
is not as simple as having the opposing
party sign an authorization releasing
those records, Defendants have argued
that a great deal of money is involved in
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this case. Thus, like all discovery and litigation decisions, Defendants will need
to weigh the need for the information
against the time and expense of obtaining it. See Victoria Bushnell, How to
Take an Out-of-State Deposition, 14
Utah Bar J. 28, 30 (2001).
17] [8] 1 13 We note that this opinion in no way
discourages parties from cooperating in informal
discovery procedures such as the use of an authorization or a waiver of privilege. In fact, it may be
advantageous for parties to agree to more limited
requests in exchange for the release of only certain
documents to expedite the litigation process and reduce expenses. m12 That being said, if a party objects to informal methods of discovery, the party requesting the documents must take steps pursuant to
recognized procedural rules to obtain the relief allowed in our rules.

f 14 We reverse and remand because the district court abused its discretion in granting Defendants* motion to compel when Defendants failed to
request documents pursuant to the discovery rules.
f 15 WE CONCUR: JAMES Z. DAVIS, Presiding
Judge and J. FREDERIC VOROS JR., Judge.
Utah App.,2010.
Rahofy v. Steadman
245 P.3d 201, 671 Utah Adv. Rep. 9, 2010 UT App
350
END OF DOCUMENT

FN12. We remind counsel that the discovery process is intentionally broad and is
designed to be simple and efficient. See
Utah R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) ( "Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter ...
which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action.... It is not
ground for objection that the information
sought will be inadmissible at the trial if
the information sought appears reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence."); Cannon v. Salt Lake
Reg'l Med Ctr.y Inc., 2005 UT App 352, \
8, 121 P.3d 74. Without the open exchange
of relevant information between parties,
the purpose of the discovery rules will be
frustrated and litigation will become costlier than it already is. If there is relevant,
nonprivileged
information
located
in
Rahofy's past medical and employment records, Defendants are entitled to it if they
properly request it, subject to the subpoena
procedure of other states.
CONCLUSION
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(Electronically recorded on May 22, 2009)

3

THE COURT:

The matter before the Court is the motion

4

to compel in the case of Sabrina Rahofy vs. Lynn Steadman and

5

Steadman Land and Livestock, Inc., case No. 070500807.

Who do we

6 I have appearing?
7

MR. SMITH:

Your Honor, Lowell Smith for the defendants.

8

THE COURT:

Okay.

9

MR. GARDNER:

10

THE COURT:

Jamis Gardner for the plaintiff.

Okay.

I was hoping, gentlemen, that we

11

could reach an agreement with regard to this.

12

hasn't happened.

13

motion without a hearing, but the plaintiff requested a hearing.

14

So what else did the plaintiff want to tell me that would justify

15

everybody showing up here today, Mr. Gardner?

16

Apparently that

The defendant has asked me to rule on this

MR. GARDNER:

Your Honor, we just felt like this was an

17

important issue related to the plaintiff's privacy, and that the

18

issues in this, we wanted to fully argue before the Court in

19

addition to just what the pleadings have presented.

20

we felt like we wanted to argue this fully because of the privacy

21

issues that are at risk.

That's why

22

We have already provided all of the medical records

23

that we believe we have in our possession that relate to the

24

collision, and what they are asking for is beyond that.

25

like it was necessary to underline that issue with the Court.

We felt
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THE COURT:

Okay.

So what else do you want to present

me today -- to me today?

3

MR. GARDNER:

Well, your Honor, we just want to

4

reiterate some of the facts that —

first of all, in their

5

objection to the request for a hearing, they represent to the

6

Court that our last offer —

7

wanted the records to be sent to us first and then we would send

8

them to them.

9

hearing was that we would —

or that our position was that we

What we had thought we had agreed to at the last
the records would be sent to your

10

Honor or a third party, and they would decide what was relevant,

11

and then they'd send those to the defendant.

12

we were just withholding that.

13

So it wasn't like

So in their objection they've either misunderstood what

14

we thought we had agreed to or mischaracterized that agreement.

15

So we just wanted to clarify that we believed the context of this

16

is crucial in that the case law that they have cited in Jackson

17

v. Kennecott, there are four factors that they must show, and

18

they fail the first three.

19

documents are relevant.

20

in our possession, and they've failed to show that they are

21

relevant to the case.

22

We've already —

They have failed to show that these

They have failed to show that they are

like I said, we've provided them

23

what —

everything we believe to be related to the collision, and

24

if they need to go a few years back, that's normally what we do

25

in these cases.

What they've asked for is gynecological records

1

from when she was 19-years-old.

2

accident and some injury -- left wrist injuries and some back

3

injuries.

4

case.

5

McDonald's?

6

determine whether or not as a 31-year-old she is now competent or

7

whatever as the -- in the real estate profession and needs that

8

information to go forward.

9

That's not relevant.

How is that relevant to her

That's not important to this

How is it relevant that when she was 16 she worked at
Why do they need personnel files or those records to

So the case that they have cited, they have failed it.

10

I believe, your Honor, that the most important factor is that,

11

you know, this is a type of issue that has already come before a

12

district court, and unfortunately the judge who had it the first

13

time around didn't have the opportunity of prior existing case

14

law, and so that got appealed.

15

We don't need to go through that process because the

16

Supreme Court in 2008 just reviewed this issue.

17

Barbuto case —

18

not mean that the patient has consented to the disclosure of his

19

entire medical history.

20

the disclosure of information relevant to an element of any claim

21

or defense.

22

confined to court proceedings, and restricted to the treatment

23

related to the condition at issue."

24
25

They said in the

Sorensen v. Barbuto, 2008, "Rule 506(d)(1) does

Rule 506 is only broad enough to allow

Therefore, it is a limited waiver of privilege,

So this is an issue that's already been decided for
your Honor, and the Supreme Court has gone over it with specific

-5reference to these type of medical requests that are beyond
what has been asked for.

They didn't -- the defendants haven't

actually made that clear in their memorandums because they've
just —

memoranda.

They've said, "We've requested these records;

they didn't give them to us."

Well, we gave them everything we

believe to be relevant, but now they want more than that.
That is where that limit of waiver of privilege applies.
So we believe that our client does not need to be subjected to
her medical records being reviewed by defendants simply because
she filed a lawsuit related to an accident. Why her gynecological
records or obstetric records, or why she —

when she had a cold

when she was nine, how that is relevant to this case.
THE COURT:

Okay.

All right.

What else do you want to

bring to my attention?
MR. GARDNER:
Cardall, the last —

Just that, your Honor, in State vs.
the last point I'd like to make, in State

v. Cardall, if they make a general request, which they've made
here, just a general request for the records from these doctors,
they —

the plaintiff still holds the privilege.

She gets to

make that decision whether those are going to be released, if
they're not related to the treatment, the condition at issue.
So she has made the decision, and as Counsel we've consulted on
that, and that's -- the decision is final, according to the Utah
Supreme Court in 1999.

That decision is final.

Now if they can —

if they —

it says, "Unless defense
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Counsel becomes aware that other exculpatory evidence was

2

withheld and brings it to the attention of the Court, the

3

decision is final."

4

case law suggests that we give it to the Court, the Court reviews

5

it in camera and then gives it to the defense.

6

offered, which that's —

7

that, because they haven't made a specific request, but we were

8

willing to provide that, even though it wasn't a specific

9

request.

10

Now if they make specific requests, then the

That's what we

we "don't believe they're entitled to

Based on what they're asking, it's a general request,

11

and that's the point.

12

requests for authorization, it related to the employment records

13

going back to when she was 16.

14

office, and he's been on the board of governors right now with

15

the UAJ, the Utah Association for Justice, which was the Utah

16

Trial Lawyer's Association.

17

letter and said,

18

that you believe entitles you to that information, because I've

19

never seen that, and I'd like to look at that and know why it is

20

you believe you're entitled to employment records related to a

21

car accident."

22

So the -- when they first sent us these

Tom Seiler, who is with our

When we received those he sent a

NN

Can you point me to a statute or a case law

You know, we've given them tax returns.

We can look for

23

W-2 f s if we haven't already given those and provide what we need

24

to, but the case law in Utah is specific already in this —

25

this case.

It's already been decided.

on

So we believe it should
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be an easy decision for the Court because it can look at the

2

precedents in this Utah court and not need to worry about later

3

appeals because the Court's already decided this issue.

4 I

In their reply memorandum, the defendants raise this

5

issue of good cause, that we have failed to provide good cause

6

for why we didn't provide these documents.

7

is always a good cause.

8

attempted to shift the burden.

9

First of all, privacy

Second of all, they've just then

We don't have that burden.

They've not cited a single

10

case

11

to show that the documents are relevant, in our possession and

12

necessary to the case, according to their own case law they've

13

cited, and that's just the generic case law, let alone the

14

specific case law on records related to privilege that are a

15

limited privilege, and our client has not released that

16

privilege.

that mentions the words "good cause."

17

They have the burden

So your Honor, we would ask that the Court deny the

18

motion, that we not be forced to sign these authorizations for

19

release.

20

to some of these records, we would still ask that they be

21

submitted to the Court for in camera review, and then the defense

22

can have whatever you believe to be relevant.

23
24
25

If the Court does feel like the defendant is entitled

Mr. Smith, do you want to

THE COURT:

Thank you.

MR. SMITH:

I would, your Honor.

respond?
Thank you very much

1

for taking the time to hear us today.

In a letter from

2

Mr. Gardner dated February 9th, 2009, here's the way he

3

interpreted the Court's order last time we met.

4

submit the authorizations to the respective employers and direct

5

that the employers provide the employment records to Counsel for

6

plaintiff.

"Plaintiff will

Plaintiff will submit the authorizations to the

7 I respective medical provider, and direct the medical provider
8

provide the medical records to Counsel for the plaintiff.

9

Plaintiff will review the records and provide those records to

10

defendants, which plaintiff believes to be reasonably likely to

11

lead to discoverable evidence."

12

We don't believe that the medial records should be

13

filtered through the plaintiff's office, and that he should have

14

the opportunity of deciding unilaterally what's relevant and

15

what's not relevant.

16
17

When we were here before, we indicated that we would
request the records, we would get them, but before we would use

18 I them in a hearing or a proceeding, we would try and agree upon
19

whether or not they were relevant.

20

those records would be presented to the Court.

21

anticipate, and we did not expect the job to be transferred to

22

the Court to receive all the medical records and go through and

23

review those.

24
25

If" we could not agree, then

We're officers of the Court.
distribute these records all over.

We did not

We're not going to

We're going to take a look at

-9the records that are there to determine whether they' re relevant
or not.
Let me just address the relevancy matter.

In their

answers to interrogatories, they identified five healthcare
providers that were out of state.

For one of those, a Dr. Brown,

they specifically referred to the fact that he treated her for
a sports related injury to plaintiff's back.

In this case,

plaintiff is claiming injury to her shoulder, knee, ankle, upper
and lower back.

We're clearly entitled to get these records to

determine what her condition was like before the accident, what
injuries were caused by the accident, and what the residuals have
been after.
When we were here before we talked about the medical
records, and we agreed that we would not seek the McDonald's
records, nor the records when she was dog walking, but all of the
other authorizations would be executed.

We would receive those

records again, to determine what her claim for lost wages is.
Now it's important to note that of the 25 employers that
she identified in her answers to interrogatories, she's had 17
employers since 2001.

That clearly would be relevant about an

earning history, what kind of job she had, why she was employed,
why she was let go, why she changed employment.
This is a personal injury action where she has placed
her health in issue, and she's made a claim for lost wages where
she has put in issue her earning and her earning capacity.
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Normally we would subpoena those records, but the scope

2

of the subpoena does not go out of the state.

3

these kind of cases we have the plaintiff execute releases and

4

authorizations; we then obtain those records.

5

This case has been pending since —

So typically in

the accident

6

happened August 7th, 2005.

7

and we have been trying since we filed our answer to gather

8

this information so we could move this matter forward.

9

prepared the case management order, which then has fallen off

10

Suit was filed October 2nd, 2007,

We have

track because we've had these discovery disputes.

11

We would recommend to the Court that the Court issue its

12

order that the plaintiff execute the releases and authorizations,

13

that those records come to us.

14

copy of everything we get to Mr. Seiler and Mr. Gardner.

15

can't agree on how those records are going to be used at trial or

16

in motions or in other discovery efforts, at that point we could

17

involve the Court to look at the relevancy.

18

entitled to gather the records.

19

in order the evaluate the claims.

We're happy to provide an exact
If we

We're clearly

We're entitled to review them

20

I think this is a -- and part of the reason we asked

21

that we not come down for a hearing was because we thought we

22

had resolved all these issues before, and maybe there was just

23

a misunderstanding as to how the Court was going to rule.

24

we're happy to be here, and I'm happy to answer any questions, if

25

the Court has any.

But

-11THE COURT:

Okay.

Thank you.

MR. SMITH:

Thank you.

THE COURT:

It isn't your motion.

motion, but I let you speak first.

You're defending the

Is there anything else you

want to bring to my attention?
MR. GARDNER:
specified —

Your Honor, if the requests had been

you know, Mr. Smith brings up the back doctor.

It

was 11 years prior to the accident, but arguably I can see the
argument for why that particular record might be relevant.

But

they presented all of these, 25 employers and five doctors

—

McDonald's included, dog walking, and gynecological records.
So it wasn't -- they didn't ask us to go through and
tell us which ones we would sign.
sign these five."

They said, "Sign these 25,

So we've had to defend against all 30 of these

authorizations for release.

If they had limited it or we —

to

the back doctor or the recent real estate professional that she's
in, maybe we can reach an agreement, but when it's all 30, and
we've already provided them the information of wages, employment,
position, they can use that information to present to the jury,
"Look, she's been employed at 17 different places since she
was -- since 2001."

They can depose her about why she wasn't

there or why she left.
The personnel files from all those people are not
relevant, and there's no statute or law that says they're
entitled to all those personnel records when we're dealing with
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a per —

2

these cases —

3

argue about how much she could make.

4

against all of these because that's the request that was made

5

to us —

6

defend against this.

7

a car accident and her future loss of earning.

In all

we did tax returns and W-2's, and then the experts

or rather, the demand.

THE COURT:

All right.

So we've had to defend

So based on that, we've had to

Thank you.

First of all, with

8

regard to the employment records, I can't see any reason why the

9

plaintiff -- why the defendant shouldn't have access to whatever

10

the defendant wants to spend the time looking for.

11

well be wasting their time, but it's their time they're wasting.

12

They may very

So within 30 days of today's date the plaintiff is

13

required to execute a release so the defendant can access any

14

employment records that they want to access with regard to the

15

plaintiff back to when she was selling cookies when she was

16

Girl Scout cookies when she was nine-years-old.

17

may never come before the jury, but I don't know that until I see

18

it.

19

execute that release.

20

excuse me, any employment records they want.

21

—

You're right, it

So that -- you're required to do that within 30 days,
They can access any healthcare -- or

With regard to the medical care records, this is what

22

I'm going to rule.

23

the Court and to the defendant a complete list of every medical

24

record the plaintiff has ever had generated on her behalf with

25

the date, the doctor and the medical problem that was presented,

Within 30 days the plaintiff is to provide to
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and the service that was provided.

2

detail, but just that much information.

3 I

You don't have to go into any

Then within -- also within that 30 days, the plaintiff

4

is required to designate which of those records the plaintiff

5

believes are not relevant to the case, and therefore should be

6

subject to the plaintiffs privacy right and not disclosed.

7

other records not so designated are either to be disclosed, or

8

if the plaintiff doesn't have the copy of the record in their

9

possession, and you know, they simply gather the information by

10

calling and talking to the healthcare provider, then they are

11

to —

12

those records -- those specific records.

Any

the plaintiff is required to sign a release to release

13

With regard to the items that are in the list that

14

the plaintiff claims should not be disclosed, the defendant

15

then has 30 days thereafter to file a motion with the Court to

16

review those records and decide whether or not they're relevant.

17

Then if that motion is filed, then the plaintiff has the

18

responsibility to gather all of those records, and the plaintiff

19

has a responsibility to have those records available so that I

20

can review them.

21

I fully agree with the plaintiff's position that there

22

may be records that are irrelevant and shouldn't be disclosed,

23

but I don't know that until I see them.

24

know what additional information they want -- may want to find,

25

what additional discovery they might want to engage in until we

The defendant doesn't
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find out what's there.

2

I'm going to throw the onus of the burden back on the

3

plaintiff with regard to those medical records, and require that

4

the plaintiff gather the information, submit the information,

5

and then with regard to those records that they don't want to

6

produce, gather the records, in the event the defendant then

7

files a request that any of those specific records be disclosed.

8

Do both Counsel understand my order?

9

MR. SMITH:

10

I think we —

MR. GARDNER:

I do, your Honor.

I think so, your Honor.

Just for

11

clarification, those five medical providers, we don't have any

12

of their records right now.

13

to have to go from her memory and call them, like you say.

14

she's -- I'm just saying

15

THE COURT:

So for her to -- she's just going
So

—

You have 30 days to provide the list of

16

every visit, and as I indicated —

17

the date of every visit, the medical problem that was presented

18

and the service that was provided, without going into any detail.

19

That may very well require that she admit that she had

20

hemorrhoids and went to a doctor for it, but that's where we're

21

at.

22

don't make —

23

this point.

24
25

what was it, every visit,

I don't -- if there were disclosures made, obviously we
we're not going to get into those disclosures at

Then once you provide that list, then the burden shifts
to the defendant to go through that list and say, "I want —

I
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believe that this record is something the Judge should look at,"

2

and then they designate those records.

3

that.

4

filed, then you —

5

gather the records and provide them to the Court, and then I will

6

look at them in camera and make a determination as to whether or

7

not they ought to be disclosed.

8
9
10

They have 30 days to do

Once those are presented to you, then —

and a motion is

I'm going to give you an additional 30 days to

MR. GARDNER:

I just wanted to confirm that in that 30

days, I don't think it's reasonable that we'll be able to get the
actual records, but she's going to do her best to provide them.

11

THE COURT:

Yeah, you have 90 days, essentially, to get

12

the records, if my math is right.

You have 30 days to designate

13

the records —

14

which ones they want you to —

15

pro —

16

produce, and I guess they could do that in five days if they

17

want.

18

provided, you have an additional 30 days to gather all of those

19

records and submit them to the Court.

well, and then they have 30 days to designate
that they think that should be

they think should be produced that you don't want to

But then you have from that time —

20

MR. GARDNER:

21

THE COURT:

22

MR. GARDNER:

23

THE COURT:

that notice is

I just mean in that first 30 days.
Right.

No, I understand.

It will be based on what she can remember.
Yeah, you'll have at least 60 days to gather

24

whatever records need to be presented to me so I can determine

25

whether they should be presented to the —

produced to the

-16defendant.

2

MR. SMITH:

Your Honor, I understand it's just not what

3

she can remember.

4

contact the doctors and find out what those

5

She has to take some affirmative action to

THE COURT:

That's correct.

—

That is —

it's her

6

responsibility.

7

interest, and we don't know, you don't know, I don't know if

8

there really is a privacy interest to be protected, she has the

9

burden of gathering that information and providing it.

Since she wants to protect that privacy

If she

10

doesn't, then I may very well impose some sanctions, which could

11

be fairly serious in this case.

12

I realize that the plaintiff s position is that all

13

of this information should be filtered through the plaintiff,

14

and I just disagree with that.

15

appropriate -- plaintiff s Counsel is not the appropriate party

16

to filter whether or not —

17

determine whether evidence is or is not relevant.

18

not the plaintiffs Counsel's prerogative.

19

MR. GARDNER:

I —

the plaintiff is not the

to provide the filtering process to

I just want to —

That's simply

just trying to clarify

20

to that first 30-day list may not be based on actual records, but

21

will be based on her homework that she's doing to get that list

22

and calling the doctors, but I don't know that we'll be able to

23

get the actual records for that first 30-day list.

24
25

THE COURT:

Well, and if I —

and I'm not saying that

you have to have the actual records, but the information that you
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provide better be accurate, because if it's not, then I may very

2

well impose some sanctions because I —

3

long enough.

4

essentially stalls the case.

5

issue get resolved.

this has been going on

I'd hoped that you'd be able to resolve it.

This

You know, I'd like to see this

6 1

Mr. Smith, can you prepare an order for my signature?

7

MR. SMITH:

Thank you, your Honor.

8

THE COURT:

All right.

9
10

enough.

I will.

I hope that I've made it clear

Let me see if there is anything else.
MR. SMITH:

May I suggest to the Court that we may

11

need to submit an amended case management order, but we'll work

12

together to prepare that.

13
14

THE COURT:

See if you can work that out.

All right.

Thank you.

15

MR. SMITH:

Thank you very much.

16

THE COURT:

That's all in that matter, and that

17 I concludes the matters on the Court's 9 o'clock calendar.
18

MR. SMITH:

Have a nice weekend, your Honor.

19

THE COURT:

Thank you.

20

(Hearing concluded)
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

SABRINA RAHOFY, an individual,

:
:
:

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO
COMPEL

v.

:

Civil No. 070500807

LYNN STEADMAN, an individual,
and STEADMAN LAND &
LIVESTOCK, LLC,

:
:
:

Judge G. Michael Westfall

Plaintiff,

Defendants.

This matter having come before the Court on the Defendants' Motion to Compel,
and having reviewed the memoranda in the matter, and having heard arguments thereon,
the Court finds and orders as follows:
ORDER
1. The Plaintiff shall execute authorizations for all employment records and return
the signed authorizations to the Defendants by and through their counsel of record on or
before June 22,2009. Defendants may access any employment records with regard to the
plaintiff.
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2.

On or before June 22,2009, the plaintiff is to provide to the Court and to the

Defendants a complete list of every medical record the plaintiff has ever had generated on
her behalf, including the date, medical provider, medical problem presented and medical
service provided. The list provided to the Court and to the Defendants must be accurate,
or the Court may impose sanctions. Plaintiff is to designate which of the medical records
listed, plaintiff believes are not relevant to this case and therefore, subject to privacy.
3.

Defendants shall be entitled to receive medical records for those records to

which Plaintiff does not claim a privacy privilege.

Plaintiff is either to disclose those

specific records directly to Defendants, or, if the Plaintiff does not have a copy of a specific
record in her possession, Plaintiff is required to sign an authorization for release to release
those specific records.
4.

Regarding Plaintiffs designation of health care providers which Plaintiff

claims are privileged and irrelevant to the issues raised in this litigation, Defendants have
30 days after receipt of the list of health care providers which Plaintiff claims are irrelevant
and subject to privacy, to object to Plaintiff's designation by filing a motion with the Court.
5.

In the event that Defendants file a motion with the Court, Plaintiff will have

an additional 30 days to obtain all such records from the various health care providers and
submit all such records to the Court. The Court will review these records in camera, and
make a determination as to whether or not they are to be disclosed.

2
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DATED t h i s / / day of

Approved as to form:

Jamis M. Gardner
Attorneys for Plaintiff

6/?/*?

3

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was mailed,
postage prepaid, this

day of

, 2009, to:

Jamis M. Gardner
ROBINSON, SEILER & ANDERSON, LC
2500 N. University Ave.
P.O. Box 1266
Provo, UT 84603-1266
Attorneys for Plaintiff

4

Tab 10

Lowell V. Smith, #3006
Thomas E. Stamos, #5885
SMITH & GLAUSER
A Professional Corporation
1218 East 7800 South, Suite 300
Sandy, Utah 84094
Telephone: (801)562-5555
Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

SABRINA RAHOFY, an individual,
Plaintiff,

:
:
:

LYNN STEADMAN, an individual,
and STEADMAN LAND &
LIVESTOCK, LLC,

:
:
:
:
:

v.

DEFENDANTS' FIRST SET OF
INTERROGATORIES TO PLAINTIFFS

Civil No. 070500807
Judge G. Michael Westfall

Defendants.

COME NOW the Defendants, Lynn Steadman and Steadman Land & Livestock, LLC,
and in accordance with the provisions of Rule 33, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, submits
herewith the following interrogatories to be answered by the Plaintiffs under oath and within
thirty (30) days of the date of service hereof.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR USE
All information is to be divulged which is in the possession of the individual or
corporate party, attorneys, investigators, agents, employees or other representatives of the
named party and their attorney.
A "health care provider" as used in these interrogatories is meant to include any
medical doctor, osteopathic physician, psychiatrist, psychologist, mental health therapist,
nurse practitioner, nurses assistant, acupuncturist, neuropathologist, massage therapist,
podiatrist, doctor of chiropractic, naturopathic physician, or other person who performs any
kind of healing art.
Where an individual interrogatory calls for an answer which involves more than one
part, each part of the answer should be clearly set out so that it is understandable.
Where the terms "you", "plaintiff1, or "defendant" are used, they are meant to include
every individual party and separate answers should be given for each person named as
a party, if the answers are different.
Where the terms "accident" or "the accident" are used, they are meant to mean the
incident which is the basis of this lawsuit, unless otherwise specified.
These interrogatories shall be deemed continuing so as to require further and
supplemental answers should the Plaintiff receive additional pertinent information between
the time the answers are served and the time of trial.
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INTERROGATORIES
1.

Identify yourself by stating the date and place of your birth, your social security

number, all names that you have ever gone by, and the dates for which you have gone by
each such name.
2.

State each and every address which you have had in the last ten (10) years,

the dates of your residence at each, and identify all individuals who resided with you at
each such address.
3.

Set forth your marital history including the dates and places of each marriage,

the name, address and phone number of each spouse and former spouse(s) and the date,
place and manner of termination of each marriage.
4.

State the name, birth dates and addresses of each of your children.

5.

State your social security number.

6.

If you have ever been a party to a lawsuit or have made a personal injury claim

before, please state the date for each lawsuit or claim, the nature of each lawsuit or claim,
the names and addresses of all parties involved in the lawsuit or claim, and describe the
disposition of the lawsuit or claim.
7.

If you have ever been convicted of a felony or misdemeanor involving honesty,

such as theft, please state the date of the conviction, the place of the conviction, and the
charge(s) for which you were convicted.
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8.

Please state the name, address, phone number, and employer of each person

who may have or claims to have knowledge of the accident or any of the events leading
up to it or related events occurring thereafter.
9.

Please identify and describe whether any recorded statements, photographs,

video footage, drawings, diagrams, tests, inspections, measurements, or investigations
were made or performed regarding the accident scene, any of the objects involved in the
accident, or any of the persons involved in the accident, and describe the item prepared
or done, indicate the date such item was taken or prepared, and the name and address of
the person in possession of each such item.
10.

State and fully describe all special damages that you are claiming in this

lawsuit including but not limited to medical expenses, future medical expenses, lost wages,
future losses of earning capacity, etc., and indicate the amounts you are claiming, your
method for arriving at each such amount, and describe all documentation in your
possession which supports or may refute such claims.
11.

Describe in detail all injuries and symptoms, whether physical, mental or

emotional, experienced since the occurrence and claimed to have been caused,
aggravated, or otherwise contributed to by the occurrence.
12.

If any of the injuries or conditions for which you claim damages for personal

injuries caused by the accident are an aggravation of a preexisting condition, please
identify which conditions are an aggravation of a preexisting condition, describe in detail
the preexisting conditions, and state the name and address of each medical practitioner
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who treated you for the preexisting condition, the date of treatment and the nature of such
treatment.
13.

If you have suffered any aggravation of the symptoms or injuries which you

claim from this accident since the time of the accident, please state the date of each such
aggravation, the cause of each such aggravation, a detailed description of each
aggravation, the names and addresses of all persons who may have witnessed the
aggravation, and the names and addresses of all medical practitioners rendering treatment
for such aggravations.
14.

State the name and address of each medical care provider, including but not

limited to, each hospital, psychiatrist, psychologist, mental health agency, mental health
therapist,

chiropractor,

nurse

practitioner,

physician's

assistant,

acupuncturist,

neuropathologist, massage therapist, or other health care provider who has examined you
or treated you during the past 20 years and state the dates of treatment, the conditions or
complaints that led to treatment, and the results of such treatment or examinations.
15.

With regard to all employment or businesses that you have worked for in the

past 20 years, please state the name and address of each employer, the date of
commencement and termination, the place of employment, the nature of the duties
performed, the name and address of each supervisor, the rate of pay received and the
reasons for termination.
16.

If you have ever applied for or received disability payments, workers

compensation payments, Medicaid benefits, UMAP benefits, or health insurance benefits,
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please state the name, address and telephone number of each provider that you applied
to, the insurance plan or group number used to identify yourself, the dates of the coverage,
and sought, whether your claim was granted or denied, and if granted, the nature of
benefits received.
17.

If you have ever applied for unemployment insurance benefits, please identify

the claim number, assigned to each claim you have made, indicate whether you were
granted or denied benefits for each claim made, the date of each decision, and the name
of the government agency that issued the decision.
18.

If you have ever applied for services or benefits from any state or federal

agency including but not limited to the Utah State Office of Rehabilitation, Utah State Office
of Workforce Services, and the Utah Department of Human Services, please indicate the
date and governmental agency you applied for said services or benefits, identify the claim
number assigned to each application you made if a claim number was assigned, indicate
whether your application for services or benefits was granted or denied, and if granted,
describe in detail the kind of services or benefits you have received.
19.

Please state the first date following the accident when you consulted with or

sought the legal advice of an attorney.
20.

State the name, address and phone number of each witness you may call to

testify at the time of trial and set forth a detailed description of the expected testimony and
indicate if the witness may be qualified as an expert and if so, set forth the expert's facts,
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opinions, qualifications, rate of pay, and all other items to be disclosed as described in
Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
DATED this

day of January, 2008.

SMITH & GLAUSER, P.C.

LOWELL V. SMITH
THOMAS E. STAMOS
Attorneys for Defendants
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Lowell V. Smith, #3006
Thomas E. Stamos, #5885
SMITH & GLAUSER
A Professional Corporation
1218 East 7800 South, Suite 300
Sandy, Utah 84094
Telephone: (801)562-5555
Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE F I R " 'iJOICIAI DISlKICi „ , ; u i . '
U« >M OOUN1Y. STATE OF US,

1 /MJhilviA K M I m l i

(ui

iiiijivultj.il,

DEFENDANTS' FIRST REQUEST FOR
PRODUCTION OF DOCUMNETS

Plaintiff,

^r
LYNN STEADMAN, w\ iml ,vl i..i,
and STEADMAN LAND &
LIVESTOCK, LLC,

070500807
V

JUU

.-^

Defend • 's.

*. uuf endants, and in accordance with the provisions of Rule 34, Utah
Rul*^ •" * "^'M procedur< . * *' l Is huirwith llii

lull

i \\ I "Y?i(uc;jl lui I njuJuUiuii ul"

. u^.i*uinis. i n.>no roquesls nro lo he i'osponded s *1 , Plaintiffs within thirty (30) days of
the date of s e i w - r.4- *.v> * \*
^ctndy, Utah 8409 i
hf-n

' *.>•.•

» -

; . .,* -, ,,outl 1, Suite 300,

i ubj^v* :\- v -"joo to ^ny request, or any part therer4
•

:

_

Wllll ,- v

,ne specific objection as to eac!i part.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR USE
All documents are to be produced which are in the possession of the individual or
corporate party, his attorneys, investigators, agents, employees, or other representatives
of the named party and his attorney. The terms "accident" or "the accident" are meant to
include the incident which is the basis of this lawsuit, unless otherwise specified.
The terms "you," "plaintiff1 or "defendant" are meant to include every individual party.
Full and separate responses should be given for each named person as a party, if
requested.
The term "document" is meant to include, but is not limited to, all writings, notes,
memoranda, correspondence, charts, graphs, records, tapes, pictures, recorded,
photographed, sketched, drawn or otherwise produced, maintained or stored information.
REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION
Produce:
1. A copy of your driver's license, permit or certificate, which authorizes you to
operate a motor vehicle.
2. Each and every written or recorded statement made by any party or witness.
3. Each and every photograph or motion picture taken of the accident scene or of
any objects or person involved in the accident.
4. Each and every drawing or diagram of the scene of the accident or of any object
involved in the accident which you intend to use during the trial of the action.
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\

LaiJi and every report of nnv tests irn pe» Hon ./ measurement made or taken

with respect to the .:•
6, Each and every report of any investigation conducted concerninq tl n > n< < iH» >i ml H I
question.
< A ciiM'',uIum vitae of each and every person who is skilled m >\ p i i i i ' i ' m i >i
j y cji; ^

.. -,.;.».^

uinnq the trial of this action, and wtiu lias

expressed an o! union upor -«M- issue in this acn^n.
8, Each and every medical report, medical record, hospital report, or other docs v
winch relates to the injuries anc >- ••••

- ••

-.

•

I or emotion.il,

experienced since the occurrence ana claimed to *avo been caused, aggravated, oi
otherwise contributed to h) / it.
9. _ Each and every report of any diagnostic study, test or procedure norfi i-oiiod sin< ;e
the accident.
bach and C»V<MV receipt bih rheck, invoice orothf i ilnniiiiriil ivlm In MHipmIs
y

•

: ^ , allegedly incurred as a result of this accident.

-ach «nd every medical report, medical record hospiUH '•'- *•-* hospital report,
io.aiuu a> .my pre-existing condition i.

;

O J allege was

aggravated by the accident.
I I-:I. Lach and every report or other document whicf i you contend supports your claim
for lost time from gainful employr i ler it.
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13. Each and every document which you contend supports your claim for impairment
to earning capacity.
14. Each and every record, written memoranda, copies of Federal or State Income
Tax Returns, or other document which purports to show all or any portion of the income
received by you for the five years immediately preceding the accident to the present time.
15.

Each and every application, record, written memoranda, report or other

document submitted to the governmental agency and/or private provider to support your
claim for disability benefits and/or worker's compensation benefits, the decision granting
or denying benefits, and if granted, each and every record, written memoranda, report or
other document which shows all or any portion of payments received from disability or
workmen's compensation.
16.

Please provide copies of all health insurance records, claim forms, eligibility

cards, or other documents you may have in your possession with respect to all health
insurance policies, plans of health insurance, or health insurers in your possession.
17.

Please provide copies of all of your unemployment insurance benefit

applications, state agency records granting or denying unemployment insurance benefits,
or other documents you may have in your possession with respect to each and every claim
you have made for unemployment insurance benefits with any state agency.
18.

Please provide copies of each and every application that you have submitted

for services or benefits from any state or federal agency including but not limited to the
Utah State Office of Rehabilitation, Utah State Office of Workforce Services, and the Utah
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Department of Human Services, copies of any and all other documents and records in your
possession relating to onr 11. in» I1" • v* i y«1. \\\\\ yi M 11i,1v 1111. u\*i, ;md if you have received any
services or benefits from any agency, a copy of all documents and records rolatinrj l<) I ho
S e r v i c e s ni hi j iin«fil" yi II i 11 m/i» r VIA Jlvud.

'i -j. Hlea.se provide copies of any and all video footage 01 plmloijmplu; oi pl.'iiniili
lakon Min,i n.t iiri'wi.i IMP if f if if i l l i iriileilyiiig your complaint,
20.

Please prodiK-o each and every documei it identified it i yoi jr answers to

ifHnrrrKj.'ik^f^:. Li;rvoa jimu;taneously with these requests.
2

Ph-^e produce each

:\

omjrf

."to

evidence ai iin. , ;... oi irin!
22. Please nr™!<»';o any - i 1 " 1 ^ ' i ' til' *ii«i i»s, I -lylmiois oi appointments you may have
for the pastfiv- \ua^>.
z.

Pi'^j-

ii»,i! iIIii .I! il

II coll phone records including but not limited to

itemized billed and call records for the 30 days preceding the acciden' • •• • *

*ays

foil*
• Please produce any ai id all credit card stntomonh 1 im I In \\,\U; ol ||M> aa;hlont

Jb Please produce any and all e-mail ror.( ml*, im ihm r« n iminwing the accident that
I" *,rn ' v.-iy discuss the accident or the property where it occui red.
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DATED this _£f£5-day of January, 2008.

SMITH & GLAUSER, P.C.

yc/y^r C^iJflriUte***131
(ELL V. SMITF
THOMAS E. STAMOS

Attorneys for Defendants

6

JUN-05-2004

P. 001

18:113

0^*^

«P

B
gQCjALgECXJRITY
%

100! J >treet
Denver, Colorado 80202
VTA TELEFACSIMILE
Smith &G!auser,F*C.
1218 East 7800 South, Suite 300
Sandy, UT 84094

Stated-.

^aseNo.uyf
*oena Social

jSeeond Judicial District Court, County of D a v i s ^ ^ ^
RecordsfromCanyon Medical Solutions for B H U

Dear Mr Wright
you caused to issue in the above referenced case*
[ I I J C in Salt Lake City, UT to
le offices ot smittt h Glauser and produce records for
J works as a contractor of Social Security, and
ley possess are social Security Administration records* We are unable to
therefore^
comply with the subpoena for the following reasons:
We are writing in response to the sul
The subpoena purportedly requires J

Federal statutes and regulations prohibit the Social Security Administration (SSA) from
disclosing the contents of its records in the absence of written consentfromthe individual(s)
whose records are being requested.{ Release of such records in the absence of the individuals
written consent could result in civil and criminal penalties. See 5 U.S.C. §552 (b)(6); 5 U.S.C
§552a(b);42tLS«C §1306;20C.FJl.§40L100et seg^ Because the subpoena in this case was
not accompanied by the appropriate consent, we are unable to produce any records pursuant to
the subpoena.
Second, under the regulations at 20 C.F.R* Part 403 (gee 66 Fed- Reg* 2805 (2001)), an employee
of SSA may not testify voluntarily or involuntarily, as part of his or her official duties, in
litigation to which the United States or a Federal agency is not a party without the prior
authorization of the Commissioner of Social Security or his designee. See, eg.. Moore v.
Atimour Pharmaceutical Co., 927 F 2d 1194., 1197 (11th Cir. 1991)

Such consent must: (1) be directed specifically to SSA; (2) specify the records that may he disclosed, to whom the
disclosure may be made, and the length of time the coosent is effective; and (3) be signed and dated by the
^dividual

JUN-05-2004

P. 002

18:18

CfDJepartment heads [may] promulgate regulations restricting employee testimony in private
litigation.") (citing United States ex rel Touhv v. Rasen 340 U.S. 462 (1951)). Such
authorization could not be received by November 24,2010 and, infeet,is rarely given. MSSA
maintains a policy of strict impartiality with respect to private litigants and seeks to minimize the
disruption of official duties.*' 20 CF.R. § 403.100 (66 Fed. Reg- at 2809),
If you wish to pursuetinsmatter, you mustfilea written application. j£§£ 20 CF.R. § 403.120
(66 Fed. Reg. at 2810)- The application must:
•
•
•

Describe in detail the nature and relevance of the testimony sought in the legal
proceeding;
Include a detailed explanation as to why you need the testimony, why you
cannot obtain the information you needfroman alternative source, and why
providing it to you would be in SSA's interest; and
Provide die date and time that you need the testimony and the place where
SSA would present it

I<L In addition, you must state the date andtimewhen you need the testimony and the location
where the testimony will be presented You must submit the application at least 30 days in
advance of the date when you need the testimony, or provide a detailed explanation as to why the
application is not timely and why it is in SSAS s interest to review the untimely application. The
application for testimony must be mailed to:
Office of the General Counsel
Social Security Administration
Office of General Law
ATTN; Touhy Officer
P,0. Box 17779
Baltimore, MD 21235-7779
We have enclosed a copy of the consent form used by SSA, Please note that there is a separate
consent required for earnings records. Once an appropriate consent and request for records is
receivedfromeach individual, copies of the requested records will be forwarded to your office.
Please be aware, however, that retrieval arid transmission of the folder may require up to 6
months*

JUN-05-2004
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h ederal statutes provide that copies ot any records or other documents in Social Security, when
authenticated under the Agency seal, shall be admitted in evidence equally with the origuials
thereof. Sgg 42 U*S ,C. §3505, Rather than appear for the deposition, we will be glad to certify
the documents.
if you have any questions please contact Shayla Hadley at (303) 844-2346.

